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I. INTRODUCTION
In Seeley v. State,' the Supreme Court of Washington held that
the plaintiff, Ralph Seeley, could not use the marijuana his doctor was
willing to prescribe to allay the nausea brought on by chemotherapy.
Like most other states, Washington currently regulates drugs under a
version of the federal Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act (CDAPCA). Like the CDAPCA, Washington's
Uniform Controlled Substances Act3 (UCSA) lists marijuana as a
Schedule I substance.4 It is thus illegal under almost all circumstances
and cannot be prescribed by a physician.5 In deciding the case, the
Supreme Court refused to classify Mr. Seeley's right to use marijuana
as being a fundamental right for purposes of constitutional analysis.6
1. 132 Wash. 2d 776, 940 P.2d 604 (1997).
2. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. 1996). This statute was originally passed as the Uniform
Narcotic Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1970). As its title suggests, Congress enacted the statute
in order to impose a uniform system of drug control throughout the country. Almost every state
has enacted a version of this act. For a table of the jurisdictions which have adopted the Act, see
AM. JUR. 2D Desk Book, Document 129.
3. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50 (197t). Like the federal CDAPCA on which it was
modeled, this law establishes a statutory scheme to control the manufacture, distribution, and use
of various drugs. Both the federal and state statutes place individual drugs in one of five
scheduling classifications and create an administrative mechanism to change the placement of a
drug within the schedules. See 21 U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50
(1971). Substances listed under Schedule I are illegal under all circumstances except when specific
permission is obtained to use the substance for research purposes. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. 1996);
WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50 (1971). Schedule I substances cannot be prescribed, 21 U.S.C. § 801
(Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.308, and criminal penalties are attached to mere
possession. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.401(d). Substances listed
under Schedules II through V are legal to possess with a valid prescription and are subject to
decreasing levels of regulation, whereby Schedule I drugs are most strictly regulated. See 21
U.S.C. § 801 passim; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50 passim.
The statutes classify a substance based on its therapeutic value, its potential for abuse, and
safety concerns. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.201. A substance
is listed in Schedule I if it (1) has a high potential for abuse, (2) has no currently accepted medical
use in treatment, and (3) is unsafe for use in treatment under medical supervision. 21 U.S.C.
§ 801 (Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.201. A substance is listed under Schedule II
upon a finding that it has (1) a high potential for abuse, (2) an accepted medical use in treatment
or a currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions, and (3) a likelihood of leading to
severe psychic or physical dependence. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 69.50.205.
4. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.204(c)(14); see also 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11(d)(19) (1996). Mari-
juana has been held to have no accepted medical use and is therefore listed as a Schedule I drug.
5. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.308; see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 822-23 (1981).
6. Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 792, 940 P.2d at 612.
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Consequently, the court did not subject the legislative placement of
marijuana in Schedule I to strict judicial scrutiny.7 Instead, the court
employed a rational basis standard of reviewS-which, in effect,
deferred back to the legislature the power to decide questions concern-
ing the medicinal use of marijuana.
By subjecting the statute to mere rational basis review, the court
essentially told Mr. Seeley, and all those in his position, that the relief
they seek can only be granted by the legislature, as the judiciary is not
the proper forum in which to address their concern. The result
presents nothing less than a failure of the judicial-legislative process
because such relief will almost certainly not be granted by the
legislature. For various social, political, and organizational reasons,
Congress is systemically incapable of rationally and intelligently
examining the classification of marijuana as a Schedule I drug. Similar
pressures and a general deference to the federal government in the area
of drug control likewise prevent the state legislature from effectively
dealing with the question of marijuana scheduling.' Seeley v. State
thus provides a paradigmatic example of a Catch-22 that exists in
nearly all similar cases in both state and federal courts throughout the
country. The legislative process fails to address the needs of those
with a legitimate medical need for marijuana, and the courts, in turn,
defer to the legislature by subjecting the law to rational basis re-
view-the lowest level of judicial scrutiny.
The theory of representation reinforcement review escapes this
Catch-22 by providing an alternative method whereby a court may
7. Id. at 795, 940 P.2d at 613.
8. Id.
9. This inquiry presumes that a change in marijuana scheduling would have to be initiated
by Congress before it is adopted by the state legislature, given the legislative history of the
enactment in Washington, i.e., a direct importation of a federal statute. Even if the UCSA were
to be amended to allow the prescription of marijuana, state scheduling of controlled substances
is preempted by federal law to the extent that it is inconsistent with federal controls and
prohibitions regarding the same substance. Section 903 of 21 U.S.C. states:
No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part
of Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates, including criminal
penalties, to the exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter which would
otherwise be within the authority of the State, unless there is a positive conflict between
that provision of this subchapter and that State law so that the two cannot consistently
stand together.
21 U.S.C. § 903 (1994). Moreover, the recent efforts by the federal government to counteract the
California and Arizona initiatives that allow for the prescription of marijuana are likely to prove
successful. See, e.g., Lungren v. Peron, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20 (1997) (reinstating an injunction
prohibiting the respondent from furnishing marijuana to people with a medical need for it).
Presuming the impending success of federal efforts, this article views the U.S. Congress as being
the only legislative arena in which marijuana can effectively be reclassified as a Schedule II drug.
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subject a law to a higher level of scrutiny. Under this theory, a court
may apply strict scrutiny when the legislative process has broken down
in some way. The court would uphold the statute only if it is
necessary to accomplish a compelling state interest that outweighs the
interests of the individual. The courts act to correct a legislative
shortcoming by applying strict scrutiny to a law that has been passed
for reasons that may be considered illegitimate.
This Comment does not revisit the Washington Supreme Court's
refusal to classify the medicinal use of marijuana as a fundamental
right protected by the Constitution. 0 Instead, it challenges the
court's cursory determination that Mr. Seeley was not part of a suspect
class." This article seeks to show that, due to the legislative inability
to deal with this issue, people with a medical need for marijuana do
indeed represent a suspect class-a class of people for whom the
legislative system can offer no recourse. When confronted with such
a class, it is the duty of a court to recognize that the judiciary is the
only branch of government adequately situated to address its needs.
The courts must therefore subject legislation that restricts the rights of
such people to a strict level of judicial scrutiny in order to reinforce the
representation that is lacking in the legislature.
This Comment begins by presenting the facts that gave rise to
Seeley v. State and summarizing the positions taken by the majority
and the dissent regarding the standard of review to be applied. Section
III proceeds to trace the theory of representation reinforcement review
from its origins in Justice Stone's footnote in United States v. Carolene
Products Co.'2 (section III.A.), and through its comprehensive
development by Professor Ely' 3 (section III.B.). Sections III.C. and
D. examine the reasons behind the theory in order to determine the
instances in which representation reinforcement review should be
applied. These sections argue that it is not so much the salient
features of a given minority that determine whether heightened
scrutiny is warranted, but that it is the legislative process by which a
particular law was passed and continues to be upheld that is determina-
tive.
10. The decision not to classify the right in question as being fundamental was eloquently
criticized by Justice Sanders in his dissenting opinion. Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 814, 940 P.2d at
623 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (see infra notes 35 to 38 and accompanying text).
11. Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 794, 940 P.2d at 613.
12. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). See infra note 48 and accompanying text for the full text of
Footnote 4.
13. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (Harvard Univ. Press 1980).
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Sections IV and V apply the theory to people with a medical need
for marijuana. These sections show that such people constitute a
suspect class whose interests must be safeguarded by the judiciary. In
doing so, section IV traces the origins of drug legislation and of
marijuana's characterization as an illicit drug. This section points out
the central roles that various prejudices and organizational processes
played in passing such legislation. Section V examines the present
debate concerning the medicinal use of marijuana, and shows the
extent to which discreditable reasoning still dominates the debate.
Finally, section VI ascribes much of the irrationality that characterizes
the modern debate to the political and organizational processes that
influence modern drug control. These influences, in turn, continually
prevent the legislature from substantively addressing the need to
reschedule marijuana. This Comment contends that because of the
continuing legislative inability to deal adequately with this issue the
courts must apply strict judicial scrutiny by way of a representational
reinforcement theory to cases concerning the medicinal use of
marijuana. Failure to do so perpetuates the dysfunction of the judicial-
legislative process. It additionally detracts from the legitimacy of that
process by fostering cynicism and contempt toward the legislature that
promulgates such oppressive laws and toward the judiciary that allows
their enforcement.
II. THE CASE OF SEELEY V. STATE
In 1986, Ralph Seeley was first diagnosed with Chordoma, a rare
form of bone cancer. Subsequent to his diagnosis, Mr. Seeley
underwent eight spinal surgeries, two lung surgeries in which his entire
right lung and part of his left lung were removed, radiation therapy,
and chemotherapy. The cancer invaded his liver, sacrum, and the soft
tissues of the gluteus musculature. Mr. Seeley's condition was
considered terminal, 4 and he finally succumbed to the disease in
February 1998.
In the course of chemotherapy, Mr. Seeley became so violently ill
that he considered discontinuing the treatment and allowing the disease
to run its course."5 He described the nausea that resulted from the
chemotherapy as "the most debilitating pain I have ever experi-
enced."' 6 "[C]hemotherapy-induced nausea is not 'an upset tummy.'
14. Clerk's Papers [hereinafter CP] at 625-26.
15. Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Brief; CP at 45.
16. Interview with Ralph Seeley in Tacoma, Wash. (Nov. 14, 1997) [hereinafter Nov. 14,
1997, interview].
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It is violent, unrelenting retching and gagging, often accompanied by
an uncontrollable release of bowel control."' 17 Mr. Seeley's suffering
from chemotherapy included hours of agony ending with minutes of
lying helplessly on the hospital floor, curled in a fetal position, covered
with his own vomit and excrement, and unable to pull the "nurse-call"
cord a few inches from his face."
At the suggestion of one of his physicians, and after discussion
with other cancer patients, Mr. Seeley smoked a small amount of
marijuana before undergoing a round of chemotherapy injections. 19
Smoking leaf-form marijuana proved to provide him with the only
relief from the nausea that accompanied chemotherapy. Mr. Seeley had
been prescribed several antiemetics including synthetic forms of Delta-
9 tetrahydrocannabinol, the active euphoric agent of cannabis [hereinaf-
ter THC] (marinol and dronabinol).2" These antiemetics were
considerably less effective than smoking marijuana. First, the synthetic
drugs took two to four hours to take effect; the smoked marijuana took
effect in five to ten minutes. Second, since the waves of nausea that
accompanied Mr. Seeley's chemotherapy were unpredictable and
intermittent, he was usually unable to ingest the pill without vomiting
it up whole. Finally, on the occasions that he could hold down a
tablet, Mr. Seeley found the "high" to be more debilitating and to last
longer than that induced by smoking marijuana. Unlike smoked
marijuana which lasts four to five hours, the effects of marinol lasted
12 to 14 hours during which time he was unable to read with
comprehension or to converse with any level of clarity.
Subsequent to being diagnosed with cancer, Mr. Seeley passed the
Washington State Bar exam. Acting pro se, he filed a lawsuit in which
he sought a declaratory judgment that the law placing marijuana on
Schedule I of controlled substances violates the Privileges and
Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses of the Washington and
United States Constitutions and is therefore unconstitutional. 21 In
17. CP at 46-47.
18. CP at 45, 84.
19. CP at 45.
20. Marinol is dronabinol (synthetic THC) that is dissolved in sesame oil and encapsulated
in a gelatinous pill form. Marinol is approved by the Food & Drug administration and listed
under Schedule 11 in Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.206(f)(1), and under federal law.
21 C.F.R. 1308.12(f)(1) (1996).
21. WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 12, 32. Article I, Section 12 provides: "No law shall be
passed granting any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or
immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or corporations."
Compare Article I, Section 12 of the Washington Constitution with Section 1 of the 14th
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
[Vol. 22:175
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addition, he asked the court for an order directing the Washington
Board of Pharmacy to reclassify marijuana as a Schedule II sub-
stance." Such an order would enable physicians to prescribe it to
patients with a legitimate need for its therapeutic effects, as they do
with other Schedule II substances such as marinol, amphetamines,
short-acting barbiturates (such as Seconal and Nembutal), morphine,
and cocaine.23 The Superior Court granted Mr. Seeley's motion for
summary judgment, and the State appealed the decision directly to the
Washington Supreme Court.24
Before addressing any constitutional issues, the court first had to
determine the standard of review against which to test the challenged
legislation. The court rejected Mr. Seeley's contention that placing
marijuana in Schedule I threatens a fundamental right secured by both
the state and United States' constitutions" and therefore refused to
review the statute under a strict scrutiny standard.26  Under a
standard of strict judicial scrutiny, "the classification will be upheld
only if it is necessary to accomplish a compelling state interest. ' '27 In
applying strict scrutiny, the courts must examine and balance the
interests of the individual against the government interest that is
sought to be furthered by the statute, the extent to which that interest
is compelling, and the extent to which the statute is reasonably
necessary to achieve the interest. Finally, the means of achieving that
purpose must not be unduly oppressive upon individuals.28
Rather than characterizing the interest as the fundamental right of
a patient to allow his physician to relieve his suffering, the court
characterized the question as being the right to smoke marijuana.29
Not surprisingly, the court did not consider the right to smoke
abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive
any person life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
22. Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 785, 940 P.2d at 608.
23. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.308 (1971).
24. Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 785, 940 P.2d at 608-09. The State Supreme Court granted
review to this direct appeal pursuant to RAP 4.2(a)(2).
25. Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 791, 940 P.2d at 611. Contrary to Mr. Seeley's argument that
the Washington state equal protection clause provides greater protection than does its federal
counterpart, the court found the protections under the state provisions to be coextensive with the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause in the context of this case. Id.
26. Id. at 795, 940 P.2d at 613.
27. Id. at 791-92, 940 P.2d at 611 (quoting State v. Smith, 117 Wash. 2d 263, 277, 814
P.2d 652, 659 (1991)).
28. Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 818, 940 P.2d at 625 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (citing Lawton
v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894)).
29. Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 792, 940 P.2d at 612.
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marijuana to be a fundamental right protected by the Washington
constitution.3" Consequently, the court tested the statute under a
lower standard of review-a rational basis test. "Under a rational basis
test the challenged law must be rationally related to a legitimate state
interest. The legislation will be upheld unless the classification rests
on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of a legitimate state
objective."31 Under this test, the means employed by the statute need
not be the best way of achieving the state's goal; the test requires only
that the means be rationally related to a legitimate state end.32 In this
case, keeping marijuana on Schedule I, and thereby prohibiting its
prescription by a physician, was considered to be rationally related to
the state goal of controlling drugs and was therefore upheld.
Although Mr. Seeley argued that no rational relationship existed
between forbidding him to use physician-prescribed marijuana and the
state goal of controlling drug use among the public, the case had been
all but decided once the court decided to apply a rational basis test to
the statute. A rational basis standard "is so minimal that the outcome
is a foregone conclusion. The test involves 'minimal scrutiny in theory
and virtually none in fact."' 33 By applying a mere rational basis test,
the Washington Supreme Court effectively cast aside its power to
substantively review the drug scheduling statute. Mr. Seeley's interests
were not examined, his circumstances were not considered, and the
question of whether the legislation is unduly oppressive was not raised.
The State did not need to prove the statute to be reasonably necessary
to achieve a legitimate end but only that it be related to that end.
The theory behind rational basis review is based on the resolution
of the countermajoritarian dilemma which, broadly stated, is the
problem posed when an unelected court imposes its own normative
values to repeal a law enacted by a duly elected legislature. 4 Rational
30. Id.
31. Id. at 795, 940 P.2d at 613.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 829, 940 P.2d at 630 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (quoting Russell W. Galloway, Basic
Substantive Due Process Analysis, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 625, 645 (1992)). See also LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 343 (2d ed. 1988) (describing rational basis as
imposing "relatively toothless limits on the state").
34. Obviously, the dilemma is less pronounced in the Washington state system of elected
judges. Nevertheless, this Comment examines a system of review in light of the federal system
since the Uniform Narcotics Control Act was enacted by the federal congress, adopted by almost
all states, and remains the justification behind the adherence to the current drug scheduling
system. Furthermore, in light of the extent to which drug enforcement is federally governed,
changes to the drug classification system would have to be federally mandated in order to be
effective. This is evidenced by recent federal measures to counteract the recent initiatives passed
in California and Arizona legalizing the prescription of marijuana.
[Vol. 22:175
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basis review thus demonstrates the courts' deference to the legislative
role of identifying state goals and enacting the laws to achieve them.
This dilemma is not present when a legislative enactment infringes on
an individual's fundamental rights since such rights are preserved by
the Constitution and are outside the realm of the legislature.
Justice Sanders dissented from the majority's decision not to
subject the statute to strict scrutiny." He based his dissent not on
the equal protection arguments advanced by Mr. Seeley, but on the
substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.36
According to the dissent, "the problem is how the government treats
Mr. Seeley, not that Mr. Seeley is treated differently from others.
Equalizing injustice does not cure it. '"' Unlike the majority, which
classified Mr. Seeley's interest as his right to have marijuana prescribed
to him, the dissent considered the rights in question to include
specifically personal concerns of bodily autonomy coupled with the
personal desire to mitigate if not alleviate needless physical suffer-
ing.38
Had the right in question been deemed fundamental, the statute
could not have survived strict scrutiny. Allowing a doctor to prescribe
marijuana to ease Mr. Seeley's chemotherapy-induced nausea does not
35. Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 814-35, 940 P.2d at 623-32 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 815, 940 P.2d at 623 (Sanders, J., dissenting). The majority did not address the
due process argument, as the parties did not raise it in their briefs and the trial court did not
consider the issue. Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 808, 940 P.2d at 619 n.20. The issue was, however,
raised in an Amicus Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union of Washington (ACLU). The
majority declined to address the issue based on prior decisions which recognize that the court need
not address issues raised solely by an amicus or issues not raised at the trial court unless it is
necessary to reach a proper decision. See Harris v. The Dep't of Labor & Indus., 120 Wash. 2d
461, 469-70, 843 P.2d 1056, 1060-61 (1993). Here, the majority reasoned, analysis under the
Due Process Clause would yield the same result as under the Equal Protection Clause, as the
same standard of review would apply. Also citing Harris, and City of Tacoma v. Luvene, 118
Wash. 2d 826, 832-33, 827 P.2d 1374, 1377-78 (1992), the dissent argued that the court had the
authority to entertain arguments raised by Amicus as the issue was fully briefed by both sides and
was necessary to reach a proper decision. Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 815, 940 P.2d at 623 (Sanders,
J., dissenting).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 820, 940 P.2d at 626. Justice Sanders viewed the right in question as being Mr.
Seeley's fundamental right to have control over his person. Citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), Sanders reasoned that if the state
cannot prohibit abortions consistent with due process, it can hardly constitutionally prohibit the
medical drug use of a terminally ill patient.
Subsequently, Sanders showed that the law as applied to Mr. Seeley could not survive strict
scrutiny as it violates the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of substantive due process. Because
there is little relation between the ingestion of marijuana by Mr. Seeley and the specter of drug
abuse by others, and because the application of the law was unduly oppressive, Justice Sanders
argued that the law imposed "arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints." Id. at 821, 940
P.2d at 626.
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affect the state's interest in controlling public drug abuse. There is, at
best, a weak connection between controlled medical use of marijuana
and the danger of its abuse by the public. Furthermore, the extent to
which the state interest is advanced by denying Mr. Seeley the right to
medicinally use marijuana is greatly outweighed by the burden placed
on him.
The statute's effect on Mr. Seeley, and the extent to which the
hardships placed on him are truly necessary to advance the state
interest in controlling drugs, are not addressed under a rational basis
test. Once the court decided to apply a lower standard of review, it
reached a result that is technically correct-prohibiting the prescription
of marijuana is indeed rationally related to the state interest in
controlling drugs. Nevertheless, the result of this case is viscerally
offensive. The Washington Supreme Court effectively denied comfort
and dignity to a dying man.
The Washington Supreme Court's decision in this case illustrates
the paralysis that results when a court employs rational basis review
and remands a question to a legislature that is systemically incapable
of dealing with it. By not subjecting the statute to strict scrutiny, the
court refused to weigh the state's interests against those of Mr. Seeley.
It similarly refused to inquire into the relation between Mr. Seeley's
use of marijuana and the specter of drug abuse in society and to ask
whether the law was unduly oppressive on Mr. Seeley.39 Mr. Seeley's
arguments to this end, and those advanced in Justice Sanders' dissent,
were considered to be outside the realm of judicial scrutiny. Instead,
the court remanded the question back to the legislature.4" However,
because of various political and bureaucratic factors discussed below,4
the legislature will not examine the basis of the legislation. Mr. Seeley
was consequently left with no effective means of recourse.
III. REPRESENTATION REINFORCEMENT REVIEW
The theory of representation reinforcement review provides an
alternative method by which a court can subject a legislative statute to
strict scrutiny without imposing its own normative values over the
legislative body. This theory, as put forth and developed by Professor
Ely, has become "one of the most dominant constitutional theories of
39. For a full analysis of the statute as applied to Mr. Seeley under strict scrutiny see Seeley,
132 Wash. 2d at 818-27, 940 P.2d at 625-29 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
40. Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 798, 940 P.2d at 615.
41. See infra notes 270-74 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 22:175
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this generation."42  Representation reinforcement is essentially a
process-based notion. Under this theory, judicial review is most
justifiable when speech, political involvement, or the political process
itself is restrained in ways that deny people the ability to use the
democratic process to effect change. 3 When access to the political or
legislative process has been so constrained, judicial review reinforces
representation, and thus majority rule, instead of running counter to
it.
44
A. The Carolene Footnote
Ely's theory of representation reinforcement review, also known
as the process model, is grounded in Justice Harlan Fiske Stone's now
famous Footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Products Co.4 1 In an
otherwise unremarkable case, the Supreme Court upheld a congressio-
nal ban on the interstate shipment of skimmed milk mixed with
vegetable fats. 46  To his affirmation of applying a rational basis
standard to legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions,
Justice Stone affixed a qualifying footnote that has become "the most
celebrated footnote in constitutional law."47 Stripped of its citations,
the footnote reads as follows:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the 14th.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected
to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to
a more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of
the [14th] Amendment than are most other types of legislation. On
restrictions upon the right to vote, on restraints upon the dissemina-
tion of information, on interferences with political organizations,
[and] as to prohibition of peaceable assembly.
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into
the review of statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or
42. Peter Linzer, The Carolene Products Footnote and the Preferred Position of Individual
Rights; Louis Lusky and John Hart Ely vs. Harlan Fiske Stone, 12 CONST. COMMENTARY 277,
286 (1995).
43. Id. at 287.
44. Id.
45. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
46. Id.
47. J. Powell, Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087 (1982).
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racial minorities, whether prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a corre-
spondingly more searching judicial inquiry.48
By affixing this footnote, Justice Stone qualified the notion that
the Court would give wide berth to legislation enacted by Congress.
The Footnote hypothesizes three exceptions, corresponding to each of
the three paragraphs in the Footnote, in which the Court may employ
a more exacting level of judicial scrutiny. In broad terms, the first
paragraph deals with express rights, the second with the political
process, and the third with unpopular minorities.49 The Footnote
suggests that in each of these cases, mere rational basis review may not
be sufficient and that it is the role of the Court to apply exacting
scrutiny to safeguard individual rights.
Professor Louis Lusky, who was Justice Stone's law clerk and
largely responsible for the Footnote, has observed that Justice Stone
hoped the Footnote would constitute an initial effort that would be
followed by the efforts of judges and scholars to form a constitutional
doctrine." Although these did not come to full fruition during his
lifetime,51 the doctrines suggested by the Footnote have slowly
worked their way into the law of the Court one paragraph at a time.
The doctrine of paragraph 1, that certain rights deserve greater judicial
protection, emerged almost immediately in Court decisions,5 2 and
48. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
49. Linzer, supra note 42, at 281.
50. Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1093, 1098-99 (1982). Lusky wrote that "[tihe Footnote did not purport to decide anything; it
merely made some suggestions for future consideration. The modest hope was that the Footnote
would catalyze thoroughgoing analysis and discussion, and that a complete and well-rounded
doctrine would eventuate."
51. Id. Lusky theorizes that the Footnote did not get the full immediate attention it
deserved for two reasons. First, the outbreak of World War 1I turned people's attention to war-
related problems and deferred the constitutional scholarship on the Footnote. Second, Lusky
points to Justice Stone's predilection to fight for decisions he thought correct over the
development of a particular constitutional doctrine. See also LOUIS LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT?:
A COMMENTARY ON THE SUPREME COURT'S POWER TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION 108-14
(1975); LOUIS LUSKY, OUR NINE TRIBUTES: THE SUPREME COURT IN MODERN AMERICA
119-32 (1993).
52. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (reasoning that litter prevention is not a
sufficiently strong purpose to justify diminishing freedom of speech and thus striking down an
ordinance to forbid handbill distribution); see also Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942) (Stone,
C.J., dissenting).
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came to form the "preferred position" doctrine." This, in turn,
became the foundation of the selective incorporation doctrine and the
modern concept that fundamental rights trigger a heightened level of
judicial scrutiny.5 4
Paragraphs 2 and 3 sit conceptually apart from the first para-
graph."5 It is the relationship between paragraphs 2 and 3 that
establishes a representative reinforcement theory of constitutional
review and the role the courts play in evaluating suspect legislation.56
In those paragraphs, Justice Stone points to two situations in which the
legislative miscalculations of the public welfare are likely to remain
uncorrected unless remedied by the Court. The first, outlined in
paragraph 2, occurs when the legislature insulates itself from demands
for change by hampering political expression, political organization, or
voting. 7 Paragraph 3 suggests that heightened judicial solicitude is
additionally appropriate in cases where prejudice against socially
isolated minorities renders the legislature unresponsive to the needs and
grievances of the minority despite the fact that the political process is
technically fully operative.58
The concept advanced by paragraph 2, that more exacting judicial
scrutiny is appropriate if a law has impinged the operation of the
corrective political process, was embraced by the Court even faster
than the preferred position doctrine. The extent to which the
significance of the corrective political processes became "part of the
53. See Lusky, supra note 50, at 1100 (citing Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
(1943), as bringing the preferred position doctrine into the law of the Court).
54. Id. at 1102.
55. To some commentators, paragraph 1 has always seemed not quite to go with the other
two. "The paragraph is pure interpretivism: it says the Court should enforce the 'specific'
provisions of the Constitution." ELY, supra note 13, at 76. See, e.g., Braden, The Search for
Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 57 YALE L. J. 571, 580 n.28 (1948).
Professor Lusky has explained that, indeed, the first paragraph was not in Stone's original
draft but was included at the request of Chief Justice Hughes for the purpose of securing his vote.
In his books and his article, Professor Lusky describes the process by which Footnote 4 was
created. He traces the various drafts and their subtle changes from his own original draft (which
eventually became paragraphs 2 and 3), through the changes made by Justice Stone, and the
addition of paragraph 1 at Chief Justice Hughes' behest. Id.
Though Justice Stone edited out the first sentence of Lusky's original draft, it set a tone that
was retained in the final draft of the footnote. The original draft started as follows: "Perhaps the
attacking party bears a lighter burden where the effect of the statute may be to hamper the
corrective political processes which would ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of unwise
legislation." See, e.g., LUSKY, OUR NINE TRIBUNES, supra note 51, at 183.
56. ELY, supra note 13, at 76.
57. Linzer, supra note 42, at 284.
58. Id. (quoting LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT?, supra note 51, at 109-10).
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furniture,"'" is-demonstrated by Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion
in Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis.6 ° Gobitis upheld a school's
decision to expel a group of Jehovah's Witness children who refused
to salute the flag.6 An eternal opponent of the doctrines advanced
by paragraphs 1 and 3, Frankfurter tacitly but unmistakably invoked
the corrective political process doctrine of paragraph 2. Frankfurter
acknowledged that a mere rational basis standard of review is only
appropriate "so long as the remedial channels of the democratic process
remain open and unobstructed. "62 In retrospect, the Court's recep-
tiveness to the assertion of the judicial role in correcting the political
process is hardly surprising. Both Professors Ely and Lusky have
observed that Justice Stone did little more than revive and extend a
conception held by the courts since the days of Chief Justice Mar-
shall.63
Justice Stone's dissent from Gobitis helps to elucidate the way in
which he thought paragraph 3 entails a more searching inquiry than
paragraph 2. Justice Stone was not persuaded that the Court should"refrain from passing upon the legislative judgement 'as long as the
remedial channels of the democratic process remain open and
unobstructed. '"'64 He considered a deferential standard of review in
such a case to be no less than the surrender of the constitutional
protection of the liberty of small minorities to the popular will.6 5
Justice Stone invoked paragraph 3 and applied it to the facts of Gobitis.
"We have previously pointed to the importance of a searching judicial
inquiry into the legislative judgment in situations where prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may tend to curtail the operation
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied on to protect
minorities. "66 Thus, paragraph 3 expands the scope of judicial
inquiry. It is not sufficient that the political process remain open to
the minority; the process must provide a reasonably effective forum to
59. Lusky, supra note 50, at 1103.
60. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 599.
63. Lusky, supra note 50, at 1103; see also ELY, supra note 13, at 86; McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 17 U.S. 316, 428 (1819) (suggesting the appropriateness of judicial intervention when the
existing process of representation seems inadequately fitted to the representation of minority
interests); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824); Ervines Appeal 16 Pa. 256, 268 (1851) (asserting
the judicial role in limiting majoritarian power by rhetorically asking: when "individuals are
selected from the mass, and laws are enacted affecting their property, who is to stand up for them,
thus isolated from the mass").
64. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 605-06 (Stone, J., dissenting).
65. Id.
66. Id. (quoting Carolene, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4).
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address the needs of that minority. According to Justice Stone, the
Court must inquire as to whether some sort of prejudice effected the
political process in the enactment of the law.
In contrast to the speed with which the Court accepted the notions
put forth in paragraphs 1 and 2, the proposition tendered by paragraph
3 was met with greater reticence. Nevertheless, the civil rights
decisions of the Vinson and Warren Courts were infused with the
doctrine that heightened scrutiny is appropriate if statutes affect
socially isolated minorities who have no reasonable hope of redress by
way of the political process." The doctrine finally achieved full
recognition with Chief Justice Warren's decision, delivered for a
unanimous court, in Hernandez v. Texas." Consequently, the
constitutional decisions of the Warren Court evidenced a deep
structure significantly different from the value-oriented approaches of
its predecessors. 69  The interventionism of the Warren Court was
fueled not by substantive values, "but rather by a desire to ensure that
the political process-which is where such values are properly
identified, weighed, and accommodated-was open to those of all
viewpoints on something approaching an equal basis."7  Since that
time, the doctrine of judicially heightened scrutiny where legislation
infringes on the rights of discrete and insular minorities has played a
vital role in the judicial promotion of racial justice.
B. John Hart Ely: Democracy and Distrust
The scope of the cases and of the classes of people to which the
Carolene Footnote suggested that heightened scrutiny should be applied
has proved to be a contentious and widely interpreted issue. Early on,
it was thought to mean that "personal" rights were to be preferred to
economic rights.71 More recently, however, the Footnote has been
interpreted more narrowly. Professor Ely developed a theory of
representation reinforcement by interpreting paragraphs 2 and 3 to
justify judicial activism only when the democratic legislative process has
broken down.
In his influential book, Democracy and Distrust,72 Ely attempts to
reconcile the role of an appointed court in a democratic system of
67. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948).
68. 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954) (applying the notion of protecting an isolated minority).
69. ELY, supra note 13, at 73.
70. Id. at 74.
71. Linzer, supra note 42, at 277.
72. ELY, supra note 13.
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government. He spends the first two chapters of the book discrediting
the theories that lie on the polar extremes of constitutional jurispru-
dence. 73  On the one hand, Ely rejects the rigid interpretivism
associated with Raoul Berger74 and Robert Bork.75 At the same
time, Ely scorns the ability of courts to discover fundamental unwritten
values in the Constitution and thus rejects the noninterpretivist
approach as being too free-wheeling.76 What results is a middle of
the road theory developed out of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Carolene
Footnote. Broadly stated, a theory of representation reinforcement
holds that when the representative democratic process is impaired,
judges may nullify political decisions without imposing their own
values on the citizenry so long as those decisions protect the interests
to which the political process would respond were it operating soundly.
In a representative system of democracy, the needs of the populace
are safeguarded by the ability of the majority to enforce their will upon
their representatives by way of the vote. The founders of the
representative system designed two methods to protect the interests of
minorities in a majoritarian system: by the Bill of Rights and by the
pluralistic system. 7  The Bill of Rights itemizes things that cannot
be done to anyone, while a pluralistic system of representation provides
protection through the structure of the system; it safeguards the
interests of minorities by structuring government in such a way that a
variety of voices will be guaranteed their say and no majority coalition
will be able to dominate.78
Both the Bill of Rights and the pluralistic safeguard, however,
became increasingly inadequate to protect the interests of minorities as
American society lost its homogeneous character. 79 First, no finite list
73. Id. at 1-73.
74. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 363-72 (1977).
75. See ROBERT H. BORK; THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW 143-60 (1990); Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.
J. 1 (1971).
76. Linzer, supra note 42, at 286-87.
77. ELY, supra note 13, at 79.
78. Id. at 79-80. Ely cites to Madison in Federalist 51: "It is of great importance in a
republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part
of the society against the injustice of the other part. If a majority be united by a common
interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing
against this evil; the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority ... the
other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render
an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The
second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States." THE
FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
79. ELY, supra note 13, at 81.
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of entitlements can possibly cover all the ways that majorities can
tyrannize minorities. Similarly, the informal and more formal
mechanisms of pluralism cannot always be counted on to protect
minority interests."0 In the case of a minority with an interest that is
regarded as sufficiently divergent, the political safeguards of a
democratic system do not ensure the effective protection of their
interests. Indeed, there may be political pressures to encourage
representatives to pass laws that treat minorities, whose backing they
do not need, less favorably. In such a situation, an additional check is
needed to safeguard the interests of an alienated minority."
It is in these situations that judicial representation reinforcement
provides a unique and indispensable safeguard of minority interests.
Such a level of judicial review focuses not on whether a particular
substantive value is unusually important or fundamental, but on
whether the opportunity to participate in the political process, by
which such values are identified, has been unduly constricted.82
Under this process-based theory of judicial review, a court does not
engage in normative value imposition, but instead advances "participa-
tional values," 83 which clear the channels of political change that have
been hindered for some reason.84 "Because unelected judges are the
public officials best placed to be custodians of the political process,
democratic commitment not only permits but requires representation
reinforcing judicial review."85  While this role is most suitably
tailored to appointed judges by virtue of their unique, nonpolitical
perspective, the theoretical underpinnings of representation reinforce-
ment place the burden to fulfill this function equally on elected state
judges since it "will not likely be performed elsewhere if the courts do
not assume it."86
Ely is careful to differentiate cases in which the system malfunc-
tions from those in which the government merely generates disagree-
able outcomes. Strict scrutiny, according to his theory, is not
80. Id. The fact that effective majorities can usually be described as clusters of cooperating
minorities is not much help when the cluster in question has sufficient power and a perceived
community of interest to advantage itself at the expense of a minority (or group of minorities) it
regards as different.
81. Id. at 78.
82. Id. at 76-77.
83. ELY, supra note 13, at 75.
84. Id.
85. Ron Replogle, The Scope of Representation-Reinforcing Judicial Review, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 1592, 1592 (1992).
86. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 24 (1962) (quoted in ELY,
supra note 13, at 103).
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applicable to perennial political losers, but only to groups whose
interests were not given adequate attention due to a systemic inadequa-
cy of the legislature. Malfunction, according to Ely, occurs when the
process itself is undeserving of trust. One situation occurs when the"ins" are choking off the channels of political change to ensure that
they will stay in and the "outs" will stay out.87 This situation was
paradigmatically exemplified by the malapportionment cases in which
the Warren Court corrected unequal voting restrictions that the
legislatures refused to do anything about.88
While restrictions on voting fall squarely within paragraph 2 of
the Carolene Footnote, a second, somewhat more subtle, political
breakdown may take place in cases where no one is actually denied a
voice or a vote. A minority may be shut out of the political process
when representatives, beholden to an effective majority, are systemati-
cally disadvantaging that minority out of simple hostility or prejudiced
refusal to recognize commonalties of interest. The minority is thereby
denied the protection afforded other groups by a representative
system.89 Where prejudices have influenced a legislative enactment,
and where the access of the disadvantaged group remains blocked,
applying a deferential rational basis review standard, and thereby
remanding the question to the political process for a second look, is
tantamount to remanding a case back to a rigged jury." The
legislation generated by a malfunctioning system is to be treated as
suspect by the courts, and therefore subjected to strict scrutiny by
judges who are at least somewhat removed from the political pressures
that gave rise to the legislation.
C. Discrete and Insular Minorities
One of the most contentious issues concerning the scope of The
Carolene Footnote is the question of which minorities are sufficiently
"discrete and insular" to be considered a suspect class. The classifica-
tion has gained almost unanimous acceptance as applied to race, but
that cannot constitute the full extent to which the phrase is applied.
In Professor Lusky's opinion, "the phrase 'discrete and insular' applies
to groups that are not embraced within the bond of community kinship
but are held at arm's length by the group or groups that possess
87. ELY, supra note 13, at 103.
88. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
89. ELY, supra note 13, at 103.
90. Id. at 169.
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dominant political and economic power."'" If this definition of the
phrase "discrete and insular minorities" is to be taken as a standard,
the Court has yet to effectuate the full meaning of the phrase. In fact,
recent years have seen a steady constriction of the classes of people that
the Court will consider as constituting discrete and insular minorities.
Since the publication of Footnote 4, the Supreme Court has failed
to set forth a unified defensible standard by which to determine which
social groups qualify as suspect classes.92 The scope of suspect
classifications has waxed and waned with the changing composition of
the Court.93 At various times, the Court has included such factors as
a history of unequal treatment, political powerlessness, immutable and
stereotypic traits, and badges of inferiority to identify a suspect
class.94 In accordance with these factors, four groups have been
treated as suspect classes-racial minorities," aliens," women, 97
and people of illegitimate birth.98 In contrast, the mentally retarded,
the poor, homosexuals, the aged, and the children of illegal aliens have
not been so treated by the Court.
The restriction of suspect status has been largely due to a
continuing reluctance by parts of the Court to the very notion of using
91. Lusky, supra note 50, at 1105.
92. ELY, supra note 13, at 111.
93. During the Warren era, the Supreme Court was quite adventurous in expanding the set
of suspect classifications beyond the core case of race. The Warren Court at one time or another
approached all laws regarding the comparative disadvantage of aliens, persons of "illegitimate"
birth, and poor people, as suspect. Id. at 148. The Burger Court paid lip service to the general
idea, but as Ely has noted, that "Court's performance on this score has not matched its rhetoric."
Id.
94. See generally Thomas W. Simon, Suspect Class Democracy: A Social Theory, 45 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 107 (1990); see also Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
313 (1976) (per curiam) (emphasizing the stereotypic nature of suspect characteristics); Matthews
v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976) (noting the "obvious badge" of identity worn by a suspect
class); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28, reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 959
(1973) (noting that a class cannot be suspect if it possesses "none of the traditional indicia of
suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection."); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)
(regarding gender as a suspect classification, the Court noted that the "high visibility of sex
characteristic," its immutability, and the fact that it "frequently bears no relation to ability to
perform or contribute to society," justified its status as quasi suspect).
95. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
96. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S.
475, 480-81 (1954).
97. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (identifying gender as a quasi-suspect
classification which calls for an intermediate level of scrutiny).
98. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968) (identifying illegitimacy also as being
quasi-suspect).
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the Carolene Footnote to establish a theory of judicial review." Most
notably, since coming on the Court, "Justice Rehnquist has been
campaigning to reduce the set of suspect classifications to race and 'its
first cousin,' national origin, and his campaign seems to be succeed-
ing." ' Justice Rehnquist's reasons for limiting the list to race and
national origin are allegedly grounded in original intent since those are
the classifications the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment would
have subjected to unusual scrutiny. While original intent is certainly
a relevant factor to be considered in statutory interpretation,10' many
constitutional scholars have agreed with Paul Brest who, like Justice
Cardozo, argued that intent of the framers should hardly bind the
courts hundreds of years later.102
Justice Rehnquist's objections additionally rest on grounds of
indeterminacy. Rehnquist has suggested that it "would hardly take
extraordinary ingenuity for a lawyer to find 'insular and discrete'
minorities at every turn in the road."10 3  Justice Rehnquist has a
valid point since, if the reference is sufficiently narrow, the complain-
ant in every case technically speaks for such a group. At least on one
occasion the legislation had placed the complainant's class in a political
minority (they lost), which is both discrete (they were on the disfa-
99. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 655-57 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Footnote 4 should not be made into a theory of judicial review).
100. Levy, 391 U.S. at 72 (citing Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting)).
101. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITU-
TION (1982).
102. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B. U. L. REV.
204 (1980). Brest supplies four major reasons that original intent should not bind the courts: (1)
we can rarely discern the original intent with any clarity; (2) times change and the writers of the
constitution fully expected their product to be applied in unimagined contexts; (3) it is not clear
who the framers really were, given collective authorship and an elaborate ratification process;
presumably, much of the original intent of the framers was lost or altered during the redaction
process; and (4) it is even less clear why the will of some men who died long ago should bind us
today; none of us were there, and even if our ancestors were, many of them were excluded from
the electoral process. See generally id.
Sixty years before Brest, Cardozo expressed a similar opinion:
The great generalities of the constitution have a content and a significance that vary
from age to age. The method of free decision sees through the transitory particulars and
reaches what is permanent behind them. Interpretation, thus enlarged, becomes more
than the meaning and intent of the lawmakers whose collective will has been declared.
It supplements the declaration, and fills the vacant spaces, by the same processes and
methods that have built up the customary laws. Justinian's prohibition of any
commentary on the product of his codifiers is remembered only for its futility.
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 17-18 (Yale U. Press,
1921).
103. Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 657 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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vored side of the statutory line) and insular (they could not gather
enough allies to defeat the legislation)." 4 This however, is obviously
not what Justice Stone meant in Footnote 4. "His reference was rather
to the sort of 'pluralist' wheeling and dealing by which the various
minorities that make up our society typically interact to protect their
interests, and constituted an attempt to denote those minorities for
which such a system of 'mutual defense pacts' will prove recurrently
unavailing.' 05
But even understood in this way, the reason why a minority is
distinct and insular remains elusive, and consequently the ability to
identify such a minority on any consistent basis remains similarly out
of reach. Ely pointed to the failure of the courts and commentators to
adequately define the scope of discrete and insular minorities on a
theoretical level as the primary reason that Justice Rehnquist is steadily
gaining his way."06 "Given the contorted way in which the Court
has drawn the boundaries around 'discrete and insular' minorities,
Rehnquist's reservation [concerning arbitrariness] seems well founded.
However, to admit to the arbitrary nature of current boundaries does
not imply that defensible line drawing should forever remain beyond
reach."' 07
In Democracy and Distrust, Ely concludes that attempts to
delineate theoretical models to define "discrete and insular" minorities
based on the intrinsic nature of particular groups is bound to fail.
Ascribing dispositive significance to factors such as the immutability
of characteristics (as in race) will inevitably lead to unsatisfactory
results.' Nevertheless, a theoretically satisfactory model for identi-
fying when legislation concerning a minority should be afforded strict
scrutiny is certainly attainable. The Court's failure to effectively apply
a coherent standard is due to the fact that, for the most part, its focus
has been misdirected. The inquiry of Footnote 4 should not be
confined to whether a particular group possesses a set of salient
characteristics that make them discrete or insular, but to whether the
condition of that group has curtailed "the operation of those political
processes ordinarily relied upon to protect minorities.' 9 Thus, Ely
suggested that an examination of the legislative process, instead of an
examination of the legislative product, or of the attributes of a given
104. ELY, supra note 13, at 151.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 149.
107. Simon, supra note 94, at 107.
108. ELY, supra note 13, at 152.
109. Carotene Products, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
1998]
Seattle University Law Review
minority, will provide a more accurate barometer of when a law should
be considered suspect. This approach is one that focuses on the
psychology of the decision. According to Ely, it therefore relates
directly to the functional significance of a theory of suspect classifica-
tion--one of flushing out unconstitutional motivations."'
D. Identifying Suspect Legislation
For Ely, no single bright-line formula exists by which a piece of
legislation is rendered suspect. There are, however, certain conditions
under which a law was enacted which should raise the suspicions of the
courts. A prime example is the legislative use of generalizations.
Justice Stevens suggested that the Court should be wary of legislation
rooted in generalizations that have become traditional: "For a
traditional classification is more likely to be used without pausing to
consider its justification than is a newly created classification. Habit,
rather than analysis, makes it seem acceptable and natural......
Obviously, not all use of generalizations should raise the suspicion
of the Court and cause it to examine the legislative process by which
a law was enacted. The legislative generalizations of which a court
ought to be suspicious are those whose "incidence of counter example
is significantly higher than the legislative authority thought it
was."1 2  Legislative blindness to incidences that do not fit an
accepted generalization is a likely indicator that a certain degree of
prejudice has influenced the legislative process, "for whatever else it
may or may not be, prejudice is a lens that distorts reality. 1 13
In contrast with Justice Rehnquist, Professor Thomas Simon has
criticized Ely's exclusive reliance on the process model as being too
limited. Whereas Ely placed primary importance on a minority's
access to the political process and examined social influences only
peripherally, Simon has advocated extending the examination to the
entire sociopolitical process rather than to just the legislative pro-
cess." 4 Professor Simon's criticisms proceed on two bases. First, the
countermajoritarian dilemma, the driving force behind Ely's theory, is
of diminished importance to Simon in light of unaccountable adminis-
trative bureaucracies and candidates who win elections without
110. ELY, supra note 13, at 153, 157.
111. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. ELY, supra note 13, at 157.
113. Id. at 153.
114. See id. at 130. See also Norbert Gilmore M.D., Ph.D., Drug Use and Human Rights:
Privacy, Vulnerability, Disability, and Human Rights Infringements, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
& POL'Y 355 (1996).
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attaining a majority vote.115 Second, an examination restricted to the
legislative process is too narrow to encompass the various social
prejudices that affect the political process. To Simon, Ely's model
does not address groups so powerless that they cannot even get on the
legislative agenda." 6 The courts should therefore look to external
social dynamics that weigh on the perceptions of legislators to
determine whether the resulting legislation relates to a suspect
class." 7
Simon's criticisms proceed from a misreading of the judicial role.
It is not the role of the Court to correct social ills that the legislature
has not addressed. The Court is not the body to address the cry that
"there ought to be a law." However, Simon's criticism illustrates the
limits of Ely's model and the extent to which it accounts for various
external societal prejudices but filters them through the legislative
process. According to Ely, the Court is uniquely equipped to deal
with overreaching, improperly motivated legislation that threatens the
interests of groups "whose needs and wishes elected officials have no
apparent interest in attending.""' The courts are not, however, well
situated to be the first line of defense to remedy social prejudices
prevalent in society at large.
Nevertheless, Simon's broader social model is useful in identifying
groups whose interests have been subjugated in the legislature by the
various effects of prejudice. The attempts by critics on the other end
of the spectrum to restrict the applicability of Footnote 4 solely to race
and national origin are based on an unduly formalistic interpretation
of Justice Stone's use of the terms "discrete and insular." Further-
more, attempts to reduce the application of the Carolene Footnote to
only those particular groups that exhibit the four salient features
enumerated in the Footnote miss the strength and the purpose of a
representation reinforcement theory of review." 9 Such restrictive use
115. Simon, supra note 94, at 129-30 (citing M. PARENTI, DEMOCRACY FOR THE FEW
255-74 (1988) (criticizing the federal bureaucracy as antidemocratic)); J. COHEN & J. ROGERS,
ON DEMOCRACY 33 (1983) ("In winning the [1980] victory that continues to be labeled a
'mandate' Ronald Reagan gained a smaller percentage of the eligible electorate than did Wendell
Wilkie in his decisive 1940 loss to Roosevelt.").
116. Simon, supra note 94, at 130.
117. Id. at 111.
118. ELY, supra note 13, at 151.
119. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713
(1985). Ackerman attacked Ely's process model by examining each of the four operative terms
in the Carolene footnote, i.e.: (1) prejudice, (2) discrete, (3) insular, and (4) minorities. He
argued that this model provides an inadequate method of determining which classes are suspect
and thus entitled to heightened scrutiny, since discreteness and insularity may well result in
greater political power among minorities. While this may be true, the criticism is misdirected.
1998]
Seattle University Law Review
of those terms elevates them "from touchstone to talisman. ' 12' The
emphasis should not be on whether a particular group is sufficiently
discrete or insular as those terms are formally defined, but on the
extent to which prejudice influenced the legislative process.
Justice White's dissent from New York City Transit Authority v.
Beazer121 provides an example of a case in which legislation based on
generalizations aroused judicial suspicion among the dissenting judges.
In Beazer, a Transit Authority policy excluded people undergoing
methadone treatment from employment. In arguing that such a policy
violated the Equal Protection Clause, Justice White noted that the
Transit Authority admitted that their rule "was not the result of a
reasoned policy decision and stipulated that they had never studied the
ability of those on methadone maintenance to perform petitioners'
jobs. 1 2 2  Suspicion thus aroused, an inquiry into the legislation
revealed, according to Justice White, the extent to which prejudice
played a part in passing the legislation.
Persons on methadone maintenance have few interests in common
with members of the majority, and thus are unlikely to have their
interests protected, or even considered, in governmental decision-
making. Indeed, petitioners stipulated that "[o]ne of the reasons for
the drug policy is the [feeling that] an adverse public reaction would
result if it were generally known that [the Transit Authority]
employed persons with a prior history of drug abuse." It is hard for
me to reconcile that stipulation of animus against former addicts
with our past holdings that "a bare desire to harm a politically
It is not an examination of the features of a given minority that determines whether they are a
suspect class, but an examination of the process by which the legislation that effects that minority
was passed. The theory, therefore, does not require that a given minority satisfy a four-point
checklist of salient features in order to qualify for strict scrutiny according to Ely's model.
On the basis of his theory as laid out in DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 13, this
article ascribes to Professor Ely the view that each of the salient features mentioned in the
Carolene Footnote need not be satisfied to fall within the scope of Footnote 4. Whether or not
Professor Ely himself ascribes to such a view remains an open question. Nevertheless, the theory
as presented fully supports such a reading. Moreover, given Professor Ely's disdain for the
importance of original intent in textual analysis, the question of whether he personally believes
that each enumerated feature must be satisfied diminishes in importance since his published work
well supports the reading that they do not.
120. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 140 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In an unrelated context, Justice Brennan criticized the Court's formalistic reliance on terms used
in an earlier case. Such formalism strips the terms of the spirit in which they were originally
used.
121. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
122. Id. at 609 (White, J., dissenting).
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unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest."123
While Justice White addressed the characteristics of the class of
methadone users-their political powerlessness, stereotypic traits,
insular characteristics, and badges of inferiority-the focus of his
inquiry was not on these traits per se, but on the way in which they
prejudiced the legislative process. Though certainly relevant,
immutability cannot be the talisman that some have tried to make
it. 124 Suspect status is not dependent on the characteristics of the
class in question, but on the way the legislature has treated the class;
specifically, whether the legislature's classifications were based on
reasons that are, in some sense, discreditable. 2 ' Once this distinc-
tion is made, Justice Rehnquist's indeterminacy objection loses much
of its force. Determining that legislation concerning a minority calls
for strict scrutiny need not be the product of ingenious lawyers, as
Justice Rehnquist suggests, but of judges with the will to confront the
prejudices in the legislature. Often, as in the case of marijuana
legislation, the prejudices that have infected the legislative process are
so prevalent that little investigation is needed to reveal them.
IV. SUSPECT NATURE OF MARIJUANA SCHEDULING
Applying Ely's model, the decision to include marijuana in
Schedule I must be considered suspect and must therefore be subjected
to strict judicial scrutiny. Erroneous assumptions, generalizations, and
general prejudice characterized the original enactment of drug
legislation and continue to infect the modern debate.
The debate over marijuana scheduling has been largely subsumed
within the debate over drug control in general. 2 6 Because marijuana
has been generally grouped with other drugs, it is impossible to
examine marijuana legislation without an inquiry into the way in which
Congress and society at large have dealt with drugs. This section
examines current drug policies and the origins of drug prohibition in
the United States. The examination shows the extent to which drugs
have been demonized and drug users have been stigmatized in a way
that has resulted in legislatures' inability to adequately deal with more
subtle questions such as the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes.
123. Id. at 609 n.15 (quotations in original, citations omitted).
124. ELY, supra note 13, at 155.
125. Id. at 152.
126. See infra § V.
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Dr. Norbert Gilmore has observed that the legal and public policy
classification of illicit drugs "is incoherent and shows little, if any,
fidelity to other classifications of drugs. ' 127  "Drug control models
seldom recognize fully the differences in the actions, effects, and
consequences of drug use or the purposes for which drugs are
used. ' 128  Dr. Gilmore attributes this incoherence to many factors,
including: the historical development of drug control laws, misconcep-
tions about the risks and harms of many drugs, an undervaluation of
their potential medical benefits, the impact of stereotyping, and the
stigmatization of drug users.1 2' Dr. Steven Jonas has similarly
concluded that "there are no scientific, epidemiological or medical
bases on which the legal distinctions among the various drugs are
made--only historical and political ones.' 130
Many of the factors noted by Dr. Gilmore can be traced to models
that are used to explain the reasons people use drugs. The dominant
group of models, and the group most often employed in the United
States, "views drug usage as caused by a moral, personal, or biological
inadequacy or defect of the drug user. The user is perceived as having
a deficiency in his or her 'integrity."" 3 1 Of these models, the most
prominent explanation for drug use is that of moral inadequacy. Many
people view drug use as resulting from personal weakness or moral
failure. This view holds that drug users cannot, or do not, refrain
from using drugs-which, in turn, are considered to be "evil," or
offensive on ideological or moral grounds. 132 A dichotomous attitude
toward the drug user emerges as a result. On one hand, paternalistic
government intervention is considered necessary in order to prevent or
reduce exposure to drugs, while at the same time, drug users are
despised for their self-indulgence. 133
With the declaration, redeclaration, and escalation of the "war on
drugs" in America, the stigmatization of drug users and the corre-
127. Gilmore, supra note 114, at 380.
128. Id. at 382-83.
129. Id. at 380.
130. Steven Jonas, Solving the Drug Problem: A Public Health Approach to the Reduction of
the Use and Abuse of Both Legal and Illegal Recreational Drugs, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 751, 753
(1990).
131. Gilmore, supra note 114, at 383 (citing J.C. BLACKWELL, ILLICIT DRUGS IN CANADA
158-74 (J.C. Blackwell et al. eds., 1988)).
132. Gilmore, supra note 114, at 384.
133. This attitude is apparent in a United Nations publication, which stated that "through-
out society there is suffering because of the self indulgence of drug addiction." UNITED
NATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND DRUG ABUSE CONTROL 2. (UN Publication Sales No.
E.90.I.3 1989).
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sponding rhetoric have taken extreme forms. Former "drug czar"
William Bennett advocated beheading drug dealers." 4  Nancy
Reagan accused casual drug users as being "accomplices to mur-
der."13  In a similar vein, Los Angeles Police Chief Darryl Gates
testified before Congress that "all casual users 'ought to be taken out
and shot."'136
Indeed, the very metaphor of war is "bravado used to enlist
everyone in what is supposed to be a common struggle against a
common enemy."' 37  Citing the numerous instances in which wars
have led to deprivations of individual rights and liberties,138 the most
extreme of which was the Japanese-American internment during World
War 11,139 Professor Paul Finkelman has noted that "whenever we
phrase issues in terms of 'war' we risk eroding the protections of the
Bill of Rights."' 40 Professor Finkelman argued that the war on drugs
presents another case in which a real or perceived "war" is being used
to suspend civil liberties. In support of this proposition, Finkelman
illustrated the number of ways in which the "war on drugs" has been
134. Donald Baer, A Judge Who Took the Stand, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 9, 1990,
at 26 (quoting William Bennett).
135. Stephen Chapman, Nancy Reagan and the Real Villains in the Drug War, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 6, 1988, at 3.
136. M.D. Newcomb, Substance Abuse and Control in the United States: Ethical and Legal
Issues, 35 SOc. Sci. MED. 471 (1992). The author glibly observed that Chief Gates "was
referring of course, to users of illicit drugs, such as marijuana and cocaine, and certainly not to
users of licit drugs, such as nicotine and alcohol." Id.
137. Randy E. Barnett, Bad Trip: Drug Prohibition and the Weakness of Public Policy, 103
Yale L.J. 2593, 2599 (1994).
138. Paul Finkelman, The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs,
66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1389 (1993) [hereinafter War on Drugs]. See generally Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (advancing a separate standard for speech in times of war, Justice
Holmes noted that "when a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are
such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight"); Debs
v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Paul
Finkelman, Civil Liberties and the Civil War: The Great Emancipator as Civil Libertarian, 91
MICH. L. REV. 1353, 1374-77 (1993) [hereinafter Civil Liberties] (discussing the suppression of
newspapers hostile to the Lincoln administration during the Civil War, and President Lincoln's
consequent disapproval).
139. The internment of Japanese -Americans has been termed "the greatest deprivation of
civil liberties by government in this country since the end of slavery." PETER IRONS, JUSTICE
AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES 349 (1983) (quoting
Edward Ennis, Director of the Alien Enemy Control Unit of the Justice Department during the
internment). The Supreme Court initially went along with the internment on the grounds that
the Court could not be overly scrupulous of government actions necessary to the war effort.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
140. War on Drugs, supra note 138, at 1392.
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used to undermine many constitutional rights and civil liberties.'
Finkelman also noted that, for the most part, the Supreme Court has
facilitated both the war on drugs and its consequent civil rights abuses
as well. 14 2
Like the lack of distinction between various drugs, the distinction
between drug consumption and drug trafficking has been similarly
obscured. "The prevalent linking of these two issues has resulted in
the conceptual confusion regarding the application of human rights in
drug control."'4 One consequence of this confusion has been that
arguments in favor of applying human rights to drug users "is
erroneously identified with advocacy for legalization of drugs or
abandonment of the suppression of drug trafficking." '44  The "War
on Drugs" continues to be "reinforced by the public frustration over
the growing crime and violence associated with drug use, the economic
impact of drug use, and the profound disadvantages of some popula-
tions where drug use is prevalent."' 45  According to Dr. Gilmore,
drug use is "misperceived as causing or aggravating these problems
rather than resulting from them."'1 46  As a result, drug users are
stigmatized and scapegoated 4  by the use of justifications that one
former prosecutor has likened to those that were used to justify the
141. See id. at 1408-44 (arguing that the war on drugs has been used to infringe on the First
Amendment with respect to religious freedom and that a "drug exception" exists with respect to
the Fourth Amendment and illustrating deprivations of property, and the effects of drug
forfeitures on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and on Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
of due process).
142. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991). Justice Stevens's dissent noted that
"no impartial observer could criticize this Court for hindering the progress of the war on drugs."
Id. at 601 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens suggested that the Court had become a "loyal
foot soldier in the Executive's fight against crime." Id.
143. A. Hendriks & K. Tomasevski: Human Rights and Drug Use, in DRUG USE AND
HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE, REPORT FOR THE EUR. COMM'N H.R. 53 (N. Gilmore et al., eds.,
1992) (quoted in Gilmore, supra note 114, at 363).
144. Gilmore, supra note 114, at 400.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Discrimination against drug users is, perhaps, most clearly evident in the provisions
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 in which drug users are expressly excluded
from the protection of the Act. The ADA allows the public and private sectors to discriminate
against current drug users in employment, public services, and public housing. A person who
uses illicit drugs can lose a job, a home, or state benefits with the very sanction of the state. "The
clearest sign of a society's disdain for an insular group is when its laws specifically sanction
invidious discrimination irrespective of a person's ability to meet the performance criteria for the
particular position, service, or benefit." L. Gostin, Waging a War on Drug Users: An Alternative
Public Health Vision, 18 LAW MED. HEALTH CARE 385 (1990) (quoted in Gilmore, supra note
114, at 359).
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Spanish Inquisition.'48 Similarly, Thomas Szasz has characterized the"war on drugs" as the most recent example of a war based on the
scapegoating of a despised minority. 4 9
Ely noted that in some contexts "a sufficiently pervasive prejudice
can block its own correction, not simply by keeping its victims 'in the
closet' but also by convincing even them of its own correctness.' 50
This has apparently come to be the case with drug users. The present
legal and public policy responses to drug use have "reduced respect for
the human rights of drug users. Unlike nonusers, many drug users are
marginalized, often impoverished, and [have often been] stigmatized,
scapegoated and discriminated against prior to using drugs, and they
are made even more so by their drug use."'' As a result, drug users
are often hidden from society. Whatever opportunities they may have
to exercise their rights are likely to be imperiled if they were known to
use drugs or have a criminal record because of their drug use.1
52
Consequently, it is "not uncommon that people in such situations will
exclude themselves from society, fail to seek respect for their rights,
and forgo exercising them, even when opportunities to exercise their
rights are available. The adverse influences to which they are prey
148. Barnett, supra note 137, at 2612. "The underlying logic and motivation of the war on
drugs can perhaps best be understood as a modern example of the theory used to justify the
inquisition: the doctrine of righteous persecution. Drug use is heresy and heretics must be
punished for their own good as well as to preserve the morality of society." Id.
149. Perhaps the most forceful expression concerning the scapegoating of drug users was
stated by Szasz who wrote:
If history teaches us anything at all, it teaches us that human beings have a powerful
need to form groups and that the sacrificial victimization of scapegoats is often an
indispensable ingredient for maintaining social cohesion among the members of such
groups. Perceived as the very embodiment of evil, the scapegoat's actual characteristics
or behavior are thus impervious to rational analysis. Since the scapegoat is evil, the
good citizen's task is not to understand him (or her, or it), but to hate him and to rid
the community of him. Attempts to analyze and grasp such a ritual purgation of society
of its scapegoats is perceived as disloyalty to, or even an attack on, the 'compact
majority' and its best interests.
In my opinion, the American 'war on drugs' represents merely a new variation in
humanity's age-old passion to 'purge' itself of its 'impurities' by staging vast dramas of
scapegoat persecutions. In the past, we have witnessed religious or 'holy' wars waged
against people who professed the wrong faith; more recently, we have witnessed racial
or 'eugenic' wars, waged against people who possessed the wrong genetic makeup; now
we are witnessing a medical or 'therapeutic' war, waged against people who use the
wrong drugs.
Thomas Szasz, The Morality of Drug Controls, in DEALING WITH DRUGS 327, 328-29 (Ronald
Hamowy ed., 1987) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Hamowy].
150. ELY, supra note 13, at 165.
151. Gilmore, supra note 114, at 408. See also Beazer, 440 U.S. at 609 (White, J., dissent-
ing).
152. Gilmore, supra note 114, at 436.
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become a self fulfilling prophecy." '153 Ironically, it is the comparative
smallness of the illicit drug problem that additionally works to prevent
drug users from achieving legislative modification of drug scheduling.
"Too few people use illicit drugs (or will admit to doing so) to
constitute a major political force."1 4  They do however, make great
heretics 5' with whom other groups have little interest in allying.
Whether or not people who recreationally use illicit drugs should
have a voice in the legislature is beyond the scope of this inquiry.
However, it is due largely to prevailing stereotypes regarding illicit
drug users that the voices of people with a legitimate medical need for
marijuana go unheeded. The factors that preclude drug users from
having their interests represented are all the more pronounced in the
case of people with a medical need for marijuana. Most people in that
situation are desperately ill and do not have the strength, the inclina-
tion, or the resources to lobby the legislature or to take on a legal
battle.
In that respect, Mr. Seeley provided a notable exception. When
asked why he was undertaking his lawsuit, Mr. Seeley answered that
most people who use the drug illegally either get cured and have no
interest in paying a lawyer to start a legal process in which they will
have to admit they committed a crime, or they die. Thus, I am in
a unique position: I have standing, I don't have to pay a lawyer
[since he was a lawyer himself] and after eight years of dealing with
this disease, my perspectives have changed to the point that I don't
care about admitting to using an illegal drug.156
Mr. Seeley's ambivalence toward the legality of his actions
underscores a cynicism toward the law that results from current
marijuana laws and from the drug war in general. Perhaps the most
difficult costs of the current policies are those that relate to the
widespread defiance of the drug prohibition laws. Labeling as
criminals the tens of millions of people who use drugs illicitly, and
subjecting them to the risks of criminal sanctions generates a cynicism
toward other laws and toward the law in general. This policy
additionally fosters a sense of hostility and suspicion toward law
enforcement officials among otherwise law-abiding citizens.'57 In
153. Id. at 408.
154. Barnett, supra note 137, at 2597.
155. Id.
156. Letter from Ralph Seeley to Washington State Attorney General Christine Gregoire
(Nov. 10, 1994) (on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
157. E.A. Nadleman, Drug Prohibition in the United States: Costs, Consequences, and
Alternatives, 245 SCIENCE 939, 942 (1989).
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that regard, the refusal to allow for the prescription of marijuana
threatens the very legitimacy of the legal system in the eyes of those
who choose to use marijuana to alleviate their physical suffering and
in the eyes of those who sympathize with that choice.
A. Historical Origins of Drug Prohibition
An analysis of the history of drug legislation reveals the extent to
which the legislative process was influenced by various forms of
prejudice. From the time the earliest prohibitionary drug laws were
passed, Congress has repeatedly relied on generalizations whose
instances of counterexample are higher than Congress has recognized.
Similarly, the current attempts to address the rescheduling of marijuana
have been characterized by a disregard for objective data, irrational
assertions, and ad hominem attacks. Given the current prejudices in the
legislature and in society against drugs and drug users, people with a
legitimate medical need for marijuana cannot hope to have their
interests adequately represented.
Numerous authors have studied the origins of drug prohibition in
this country. Surveys of the methods by which the prohibitionary
legislation was passed in the early part of this century reveal the extent
to which functional racism and moral totalitarianism played central
roles."' 8 A telling example is provided in the Report on the Interna-
tional Opium Commission delivered to Congress by Dr. Hamilton
Wright in 1910.159 Though the methods of his study have since
been generally discredited, Dr. Wright's report provided the conceptual
basis for remedial legislation regarding drugs in the first two decades
of the twentieth century.160
Dr. Wright was unrestrained in his use of racial stereotypes. He
reported to Congress that "it has been authoritatively stated that
158. See, e.g., STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR:
RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS (1993); THOMAS SZASZ, OUR RIGHT
TO DRUGS: THE CASE FOR A FREE MARKET (1992); Erik Grant Luna, Our Vietnam: The
Prohibition Apocalypse, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 483 (1997).
159. HAMILTON WRIGHT, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL OPIUM COMMISSION AND
ON THE OPIUM PROBLEM AS SEEN WITHIN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS POSSESSIONS, S.
Doc. No. 61-377 (1910) [hereinafter REP. ON INT'L OPIUM COMM'N]. Dr. Wright was the
driving force behind much of the antinarcotic legislation in the early part of the century. In 1908,
President Theodore Roosevelt appointed him to the U.S. delegation that would attend the 1909
International Opium Commission in Shanghai. Upon his appointment, he immediately launched
an investigation into American drug use and abuse. His findings were reported to Congress in
1910. See generally H. WAYNE MORGAN, DRUGS IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL HISTORY, 1800-
1980 at 98-100 (1981).
160. Luna, supra note 158, at 499-500.
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cocaine is often the direct incentive to the crime of rape by the negroes
of the South and other sections of the country."16' The report did
not limit itself to invoking prejudices against African-Americans. It
also included "evidence" designed to play to anti-Chinese sentiments.
Dr. Wright's report asserted that: "One of the most unfortunate
phases of the habit of opium smoking in this country is the large
number of [white] women who have become involved and [are] living
as common-law wives or cohabiting with Chinese in the Chinatowns
of our various cities. 162
Dr. Wright was hardly alone in his appeals to the racial prejudices
that were prevalent in Congress at the time. Although incidence of
drug use among African-Americans at the turn of the century was
relatively rare, 163 myths of rampant drug use among African-
Americans and tall tales of the frightening effects drugs had on that
population were liberally used by advocates for narcotics prohibi-
tion.164 One doctor testified before the House of Representatives that
African-Americans on cocaine "have an exaggerated ego. They
imagine they can lift this building, if they want to, or can do anything
they want to. They have no regard for right or wrong. "165 Another
myth held that, when using cocaine, African-Americans were impervi-
ous to .32 caliber bullets. Several police departments of the South
responded to this myth by switching to .38 caliber firearms and by
redoubling efforts to subdue African-American society.'66 While
logic may not have moved many congressmen to effectuate a prohibi-
tionist agenda, the image of African-Americans becoming "oblivious
of their proscribed bounds and attacking white society'' 67 was
sufficient to inflame the sensibilities of many in Congress.
Though the specific myths varied according to locale, race-
oriented propaganda of prohibitionists shared two common traits.
First, "each narcotic was invidiously associated with a particular race.
African-Americans were 'cocaine-crazed Negroes,' Asians were 'opium-
addles Coolies,' and, in the 1930s, Hispanics were 'reefer-mad
Mexicans."" 68  Second, prevailing myths held that narcotics would
161. REP. ON INT'L OPIUM COMM'N, supra note 159, at 49-50.
162. Id. at 45.
163. MORGAN, supra note 159, at 34.
164. Luna, supra note 158, at 492.
165. Importation and Use of Opium: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
61st Cong. 12 (1911) (statement of Dr. Christopher Koch) [hereinafter Importation Hearings].
166. Luna, supra note 158, at 493.
167. DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL
6 (expanded ed. 1987).
168. Luna, supra note 158, at 493 (citing MORGAN, supra note 159, at 93-94).
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instigate sexual aggression, or sexual interest, by "colored men" against
sheltered Caucasian damsels.'69
B. The Harrison Anti-Narcotics Act
The prohibitionist efforts eventually moved Congress to enact
federal regulations concerning drugs notwithstanding the concerns of
a divided health profession 7 ' and opinions that policing power
should be left to the states. In December 1914, Congress enacted the
Harrison Anti-Narcotics Act. 1 ' Despite what it later became, the
Harrison Act did not purport to institute drug prohibition-to do so
would have met with far too strong resistance on grounds of federal-
ism. Rather, the Act sought to regulate the marketing of drugs in an
orderly fashion by requiring prescriptions for large quantities of opium,
morphine, heroin, and other drugs while allowing small quantities to
be sold over the counter.'72  In addition, the Harrison Act was
passed to raise revenue for the federal government. On its face, the
Harrison Act was "no more than an economic regulation, and was
never intended to prohibit the use or sale of narcotics."' 73 The fact
that the Harrison Act became the cornerstone of federal drug prohibi-
tion is historical irony. "It is doubtful that a single legislator realized
in 1914 that the law Congress was passing would later be deemed a
prohibition law."' 74
The doctors and medical journals that had supported the Harrison
bill believed that the record keeping it required would strengthen the
medical profession's control over potent drugs. Similarly, pharmacists
saw the bill as an aid in securing trade and as a step toward having the
sole right to dispense medicine.' However, once it began to be
169. Id. (citing DUKE & GROSS, supra note 158, at 10).
170. Luna, supra note 158, at 503, notes 165-66. Despite Dr. Wright's claims to the
contrary, the medical profession was fragmented on the issue of drug legislation. Some supported
strict laws and complete abolition while others believed in medical autonomy and that physicians,
rather than legislators or federal agencies, are the best judges of medical issues. Still others
supported a middle ground, advocating "grandfathered" legislation and benevolent treatment of
those already addicted. Importation Hearings, supra note 165, at 37.
171. Harrison Act, 38 Stat. 785, 1-12 (1914), amended by 40 Stat. 1130, 1006 (1919)
(repealed 1939).
172. Id.
173. Kurt L. Schmoke, An Argument in Favor of Decriminalization, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV.
501, 508 (1990).
174. EDWARD M. BRECHER ET AL., LICIT AND ILLICIT DRUGS: THE CONSUMERS
UNION REPORT ON NARCOTICS, STIMULANTS, DEPRESSANTS, INHALANTS, HALLUCINOGENS,
AND MARIJUANA - INCLUDING CAFFEINE, NICOTINE, AND ALCOHOL 49 (1972).
175. MUSTO, supra note 167, at 121. Debate over the bill occurred at a time when both
the medical and pharmaceutical professions were seeking to centralize their power and were often
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applied, the Harrison Act soon had an opposite effect. In spite of the
hopes of the medical profession, the Act effectively removed the
control of drugs from the hands of medical professionals and placed the
power in law enforcement officials. Following passage of the Harrison
Act, the fear of government intervention in the medical field as
expressed in the Journal of the American Medical Association'76
became an ever-increasing reality that survives to this day.
As it was originally understood, the Act required a dispenser of
drugs to keep careful records and to display his tax stamp. To the
question of what more was required by the Act, influential members
of the pharmaceutical profession, like lawyer-pharmacist James Beal,
replied that if the simple record requirements were obeyed, the federal
government should be fully satisfied.'77  This, however, proved
inaccurate.
Enforcement of the Act was delegated to the Internal Revenue
Service of the Treasury department. The I.R.S. was considered well
equipped to the task of registering the more than 220,000 physicians,
dentists, veterinarians, druggists, manufacturers, importers, and
wholesalers affected by the Harrison Act.'78 Not long after becoming
operative, deviations from the legislative intent began to transform the
Act from a regulatory to a prohibitionist measure. The Commissioner
of Internal Revenue promulgated regulations for enforcing the law that
were, at best, tenuously related to the goals of orderly marketing or
taxation. As interpreted, the Harrison Act soon began to constrain the
practice of medicine by regulating the ways in which drugs could be
prescribed by doctors. Additionally, for the first time, mere possession
of narcotics through unregistered channels was subject to prosecu-
tion. 17  In sum, these regulations prohibited doctors from prescrib-
in political competition with one another to do so. The Medical World, a Philadelphia journal,
feared that if the Harrison bill was not passed, retail druggists might succeed in prohibiting
dispensing by physicians and thus advocated support of the bill as a form of compromise. See
The National Antinarcotic Bill, 32 MEDICAL WORLD 91-92 (1914); see also 16 JNARD 1404 (1913)
(expressing a similar view from the pharmacists' perspective).
176. See State Rights, State Duties, and the Harrison Narcotics Law, 67 JAMA 37-38 (1916).
177. MUSTO, supra note 167, at 121.
178. Id.
179. See Commissioner of Internal Revenue, U.S. Internal Revenue Regulations No. 35,
Relating to the Importation, Manufacture, Production, Compounding, Sale, Dispensing, and
Giving Away of Opium or Coca Leaves, Their Salts, Derivatives, or Preparations Thereof (1915).
The first set of rules promulgated by the I.R.S. stated:
(1) "In personal attendance" meant that a physician must be away from his primary
place of business.
(2) A consumer cannot register under the law, and therefore can only procure illicit
narcotics from a physician.
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ing drugs to maintain addicts or to wean them slowly off their
addiction.' ° Within a few years, quitting cold turkey would be the
only legally recognized method to break an addiction.
1. Judicial Challenges
The I.R.S. regulations precipitated strong protests from the
medical community, both in the professional journals and in the courts.
Within weeks of becoming operative, the administrative regulations
were challenged in the federal district courts of Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, and Montana.' In this first round of judicial challenges,
the courts struck down the Treasury Department's methods of
enforcing the Harrison Act. The Pennsylvania court questioned the
legality of federal narcotics control and held that prosecution of a
consumer for mere possession was not consistent with the intentions
behind the Harrison Act. That court stated: "This is a revenue act;
and unless it is [construed as] such .... it would perhaps violate the
provisions of the Constitution.' ' 82
Similarly, a district court in Tennessee invalidated an attempt by
the Revenue Department to prosecute a physician based on the
quantity of narcotics he prescribed. The court held there to be "no
limit fixed to the amount of said drugs that a physician may prescribe,
nor is there any duty imposed upon him, other than to keep a record
of all such drugs dispensed by him."' 83  Finally, in United States v.
Woods, 84 a Montana district court judge decried the Harrison Act
as being abhorrent to justice. The judge predicted that the dispropor-
tionate punishment provided for by this Act would bring about
resentment and prejudice against the courts, the government, and the
law and thus called for its repeal. 8
(3) Possession of narcotics without proof of acquirement through legal distribution
channels is prima facie evidence of a violation.
(4) Only a "normal" dosage of narcotics would be considered a valid prescription.
MUSTO, supra note 167, at 122 (summarizing the contents of the Internal Revenue Regulation).
180. MUSTO, supra note 167, at 122.
181. See, U.S. v. Jin Fuey Moy, 225 F. 1003 (W.D. Pa. 1915), U.S. v. Freidman, 224 F.
276 (W.D. Tenn. 1915), U.S. v. Woods, 224 F. 278 (D. Mont. 1915).
182. in Fuey Moy, 225 F. at 1003.
183. Friedman, 224 F. at 278.
184. 224 F. 278 (D. Mont. 1915).
185. Woods, 224 F. at 279. (Using language normally reserved for "cruel and unusual
punishment" challenges, the court argued that violation of the Harrison Act is "a mere legal
infraction, and not a true crime, [the punishment] is a consequence shockingly disproportionate
to the offense, is antagonistic to sound criminal economics, and abhorrent to justice. The
inevitable result being resentment and prejudice against courts and government, law and order,
and impairment of and danger to the general well-being of society. All these evils could and
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The Supreme Court reinforced the decisions of the district courts
when it decided United States v. Jin Fuey Moy. 186 The defendant, a
Pittsburgh physician, prescribed a dram (1/16 oz.) of morphine to an
opium addict. The indictment charged a conspiracy to issue narcotics
solely to satisfy a drug addict's appetite. Justice Holmes' majority
opinion considered the Harrison Act to be nothing more than a
revenue statute and not designed to criminalize mere possession of
narcotics. The Court reasoned that Congress could not have intended
"to make the probably very large proportion of citizens who have some
preparation of opium in their possession criminal."' 87
2. Discrediting the Medical Maintenance of Drug Addicts
Decided in mid-1916, Jin Fuey Moy dealt a severe blow to the use
of the Harrison Act as a prohibitionist measure. The Court deemed
the treatment of drug addicts to lie within the medical sphere, and
considered the enforcement of the Harrison Act to influence medical
treatment to be an infringement upon this sphere. The following
years, however, witnessed radical social change that would cause the
court to reconsider its attitude regarding medical addict mainte-
nance.1 8  The country underwent profound changes in the years
following the Jin Fuey Moy decision. World War I had been fought,
the Eighteenth Amendment had been adopted in a spirit of moralistic
fervor, "and the liberalizing movements of La-Follette, Theodore
Roosevelt, and Wilson had declined into a fervent and intolerant
nationalism." '89 Perhaps as a corollary to this nationalism came an
enormous fear of Bolsheviks and anarchists which gave rise to the Red
Scare of 1919-20.190 Narcotics came to be associated with perversion
and rebellion, addiction was perceived as a threat to the war effort and
to the nation, and maintenance of addicts in clinics or by individual
physicians was considered immoral and unpatriotic. 191
The Supreme Court was undoubtedly influenced by this social
upheaval when it decided two cases that foreclosed any possibility of
a humane policy toward drug addicts 9 2 and infringed upon a doctor's
ought to be avoided by repeal of [the Harrison Act] and its arbitrary stamp of felony and infamy
upon so many petty violations of laws of the United States.").
186. 241 U.S. 394, 399 (1915).
187. Id. at 401.
188. MUSTO, supra note 167, at 132.
189. Id. at 133.
190. Id.
191. Luna, supra note 158, at 509.
192. Id.
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sovereignty to make medical decisions. The interpretation of the
Harrison Act that had been softened by the Jin Fuey Moy decision in
1916 was reasserted in 1919 by the decisions in United States v.
Doremus'93 and Webb v. United States.'94  Taken together, the two
cases banned physicians from prescribing narcotics for the purpose of
alleviating the discomfort of drug addicted patients.
The debate concerning the methods by which drug addiction
could be cured had been ongoing for several years.' 95 A survey
conducted in 1918-19 showed the medical profession to be almost
evenly divided on the question of whether addiction was a disease or
a vice.' 96 Still, the majority of the responding physicians used a"gradual reduction" treatment of medically maintaining the health of
drug addicts by prescribing small amounts of morphine or opium.197
While the report based on this survey concluded that addiction has a
disease aspect, it also conveyed conflicting notions, simplistic explana-
tions, and general confusion on the nature and treatment of addic-
tion. 98 The report was submitted to a special narcotic committee
appointed by the Treasury Secretary. The committee concluded that
while addiction is a medical problem, there was not even one form of
treatment that "appears to have been given a thorough trial by the
medical profession as a whole, or to have received the unqualified
support of those members of that profession." ''  As a result, the
committee abandoned the one element of medical concensus by
concluding that no maintenance treatment of drug addicts should be
endorsed.
By the time the committee's report was published in June 1919,
the Supreme Court had already ruled against the medical maintenance
193. 249 U.S. 86 (1919). The case involved a physician who had provided five hundred
one-sixth grain tablets of morphine to a known addict. The district court held that the
restrictions on the physician's practice were irrelevant to the collection of revenue and thus
exceeded the constitutional powers of the federal government. United States v. Doremus, 246 F.
958 (1918). In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal. In so doing, the Court
confirmed the constitutionality of the Harrison Act's tax on physicians and its control over the
manner in which drugs could be dispensed.
194. 249 U.S. 96 (1919). Webb upheld the convictions of a physician and a retail druggist
who supplied morphine to an addict for the purpose of maintaining rather than curing the addict.
195. See MUSTO, supra note 167, at 121-82 (discussing the theories concerning drug
addiction in the period following Word War I).
196. Id. at 137.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 138. See SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF INVESTIGATION, APPOINTED MARCH 25,
1918, BY THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY: TRAFFIC IN NARCOTIC DRUGS (Government
Printing Office, 1919).
199. MUSTO, supra note 167, at 139.
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of drug addicts in Doremus.21' The report thus became little more
than an apologia for the Treasury Department's newly instituted
practice of arresting physicians and pharmacists." 1  Though the
practice of gradual reduction was widely accepted throughout the
medical profession, the prohibitionist factions of government had
effectively discredited this practice.
Subsequent reasoning held that if no cure was more effective than
just keeping the addict away from drugs, then the problem really was
how to keep the addict away from drugs. 2  This question was not
a medical, but an enforcement problem. Consequently, in late 1919 or
early 1920, the newly-created Narcotic Division of the Treasury
Department's prohibition unit decided to close the already established
maintenance clinics and to oppose maintenance in every case except
among the aged and medically incurable. In order to effectively
enforce such a policy, legal restraints on physicians had to be inflexible
in order to prevent a determined minority from prescribing drugs for
the maintenance of their addicted patients; outlawing maintenance was
a weapon commensurate with this perceived need.23  Thus the
Harrison Act became the cornerstone of American narcotics regulation.
Contrary to prevailing medical opinion, addiction would no longer be
characterized as a treatable disease but solely as a vice and a crime.
Similarly, in the minds of lawmakers and of the public, certain drugs
were stripped of their healing properties and of their place in the
physician's medical arsenal.
3. Response of the Medical Community
Not surprisingly, these new restrictions prompted an outcry from
the medical community. In 1916, the New York Medical Journal called
the attempts to restrict physicians' prescription practices a "cruel
injustice without ground or authority.""2 4 The Philadelphia Medical
World, a practical journal oriented to the general practitioner, expressed
similar outrage at the Treasury regulations which forbade mainte-
nance. 21' The Medical World did not condone catering to "dope
200. 246 F. 958.
201. MUSTO, supra note 167, at 140-41. In April 1919, several New York City physicians
and druggists who had been supplying addicts were arrested. The raids were conducted by
Internal Revenue Service agents in coordination with the city's health department. Similar raids
were subsequently conducted in a number of major cities across the country.
202. Id. at 146.
203. Id. at 149.
204. 103 N.Y. MED. J. 1036 (1916).
205. Penalties Imposed by the Harrison Anti Narcotics Law, 33 MED. WORLD 459 (1915)
[hereinafter MED. WORLD].
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fiends," but, like the Medical Economist in New York, argued that
physicians had the right to maintain addicts until a cure came
along." 6 The central distinction between medical maintenance and
mere pandering seemed to be in the way the narcotic was transmitted
to the patient. For example, if the addict merely gave over his half-
dollar and picked up a prescription, and if a large number did this in
the physician's office each day, then the physician was pandering. If,
on the other hand, only a few addicts were given a prescription in a
less hurried and more professional manner, perhaps with an attempt to
discourage the use of narcotics merely to produce euphoria, the journal
considered the patient to have been "treated."20 7  This distinction,
rather than the physiological state of the patient or the effect of the
drug, appeared to delineate respectability from infamy. However, the
strength of the journals' argument for distinguishing "dope doctors"
from a physician who "treated indefinitely" did not register outside the
medical profession. 08  Such subtle distinctions were lost in the
paranoia and political pandering of the times in much the same way
that similar subtleties have become obscured today.
In the face of a 1926 amendment that would have further
strengthened the Harrison Act,20 9 an editorial in the Illinois Medical
Journal succinctly characterized the government drug policy. The
journal considered the amendment to be "still another step in taking
the practice of medicine out of the hands of men trained to alleviate
human suffering and placing it under the jurisdiction of men who
know nothing about it at all."'210 The journal further argued that the
"Harrison Narcotic law should never have been placed upon the
Statute books of the United States. It is to be granted that the well-
meaning blunderers who put it there had in mind only the idea of
making it impossible for addicts to secure their supply of 'dope' and
to prevent unprincipled people from making fortunes. 21'  However,
the article continued, instead of stopping the supply of narcotics,"those who deal in dope, now make double their money [and] the
206. C.F.J. Laase, The Practitioner of Medicine and the Narcotic Addict, 6 MED.
ECONOMIST 37, 38 (1918); see also MED. WORLD, supra note 205, at 416.
207. See Laase, supra note 206, at 38.
208. MUSTO, supra note 167, at 124.
209. S. 4085, 69th Cong. (1926).
210. Stripping the Medical Profession of Its Powers and Giving Them to a Body of Lawmakers:
The Proposed Amendment to the Harrison Narcotic Act - Everyone Seems to Know About Doctoring
Except Doctors, 49 ILL. MED. J. 446 (1926) [hereinafter ILL. MED. J.].
211. Id. at 447.
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doctor who needs narcotics used in reason to cure and to allay human
misery finds himself in a pit of trouble. ' 212
The same criticisms leveled against the Harrison Act 70 years ago
are still made against federal policy concerning the medical use of
marijuana, and are similarly unheeded. In a recent editorial, Dr.
Jerome Kassirer, the editor of the New England Journal of Medicine,
expressed his belief that "a federal policy that prohibits physicians
from alleviating suffering by prescribing marijuana for seriously ill
patients is misguided, heavy-handed, and inhumane." '  Dr.
Kassirer advocates rescheduling marijuana under Schedule II and
thereby allowing doctors to prescribe it and to regulate it according-
ly.2 14  Placing marijuana under Schedule II would put medical
decision-making back in the hands of medical professionals instead of
politicians. The irony is that many of the political arguments
employed by politicians against the medical use of marijuana proceed
on medical grounds. As noted by the Illinois Medical Journal over 70
years ago, "everybody seems to know about doctoring except the
doctors." '215
C. The Marijuana Tax Act
As with the Harrison Act, passage of the 1937 Marijuana Tax
Act216 (MTA) was surrounded by extreme rhetoric, gross generaliza-
tions, and patently false factual assertions. There are two general
theories that explain the way in which marijuana became contraband
by way of the MTA. In the leading text on the subject, Jerome
Himmelstein labels the two theories as the "Mexican hypothesis" and
the "Anslinger hypothesis. 2 17 The "Mexican hypothesis" views the
MTA as being motivated by Southwestern Anglo fears that marijuana
inspired Mexican Americans to commit crimes and act violently.218
While these fears contributed to the public hysteria that surrounded
marijuana in the late 1930s, they do not adequately explain the
concerted efforts to generate a nationwide fear of marijuana.219
212. Id.
213. Jerome P. Kassirer, M.D., Federal Foolishness and Marijuana, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED.
366, 366 (1997).
214. Id.
215. ILL. MED. J., supra note 210, at 446.
216. Marijuana Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 75-238, ch. 553, 50 Stat. 551 (1937).
217. JEROME L. HIMMELSTEIN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF MARIHUANA: POLITICS AND
IDEOLOGY OF DRUG CONTROL IN AMERICA (1983).
218. See MUSTO, supra note 167, at 219-21.
219. HIMMELSTEIN, supra note 217, at 141-42.
[Vol. 22:175
Representation Reinforcement Review
With the repeal of Prohibition, all antinarcotic activities of the
Bureau of Prohibition were transferred to the newly formed division of
the Treasury Department, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN)
headed by Harry J. Anslinger. The "Anslinger hypothesis" attributes
passage of the MTA to Anslinger's intense lobbying efforts for the
purpose of feathering a bureaucratic nest by increasing the FBN's
responsibilities and budget.2" "Anslinger's zeal to expand the
operations of his new bureau ... made ... [marijuana] a natural
choice with which to extend and publicize the FBN's role as the
principal agency responsible for drug control in the United States. "221
Soon after the creation of the FBN, Commissioner Anslinger
placed the full weight and authority of the agency behind achieving the
total prohibition of the cultivation, sale, and possession of marijuana,
even for medical purposes.222  The FBN first sought marijuana
legislation at the state level by encouraging states to pass the Uniform
Narcotic Drug Act.223 Already prohibited for general use in twenty-
four states, marijuana's prescription by a physician was only prohibited
in Kansas and Louisiana.224 The FBN's position brought the Bureau
into conflict with members of the medical profession who supported
the availability of marijuana by prescription. A compromise was
reached whereby the clause concerning marijuana was made optional
and provided only that cannabis be added to the list of narcotic drugs
otherwise included in the Act.22' However, this compromise provid-
ed empty gains for the medical profession, since the ultimate effect of
220. See HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE
(1963) (quoted in DUKE & GROSS, supra note 158, at 91).
221. Hamowy, supra note 149, at 18. Himmelstein criticizes the Anslinger hypothesis's
view of the FBN as expansion-seeking bureaucracy. He argues instead that the FBN was seeking
to limit, rather than to expand, the Bureau's enforcement responsibilities by ascribing the
restriction of marijuana to the states. Himmelstein argues that Anslinger opposed federal
marijuana legislation in the early thirties and aggressively sought to persuade the states to handle
the matter. However, Anslinger underestimated the persuasiveness of his campaign. He not only
convinced the states to enact antimarijuana legislation, he generated congressional interest as well.
When confronted with rising congressional interest, Anslinger changed course and actively sought
the federal legislation he had opposed. Himmelstein concludes that the FBN's support for federal
legislation was an unintended consequence of his earlier activity. HIMMELSTEIN, supra note 217,
at 56-57. In essence, "Anslinger had oversold the marijuana menace." DUKE & GROSS, supra
note 158, at 92 (citing HIMMELSTEIN, supra note 217, at 69).
222. See Hamowy, supra note 149, at 18 (citing RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H.
WHITEBREAD II, THE MARIHUANA CONVICTION: A HISTORY OF MARIHUANA PROHIBITION
IN THE UNITED STATES (U. Press of VA, 1974) at 83 [hereinafter BONNIE & WHITEBREAD]).
223. BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 222, at 80-91 (discussing the various drafts of
the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act that was proposed to, and passed by, various states).
224. Id. at 52, table I-1.
225. Hamowy, supra note 149, at 19.
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the change was to define marijuana as a narcotic, subject to all the
penalties attached to the possession and sale of narcotics in each of the
states.226
Anslinger and the FBN extensively lobbied state legislators and
launched a comprehensive campaign to warn the public of the horrors
incident to marijuana use in order to facilitate quick passage of the Act,
including the provisions concerning marijuana, in the various states.
Under the aegis of the FBN, the press began to carry sensational
horror stories linking marijuana to gruesome criminal acts.227
Anslinger's own comments to the press and to Congress were no less
sensational. In a memorandum submitted to the Cannabis Subcommit-
tee of the League of Nations Advisory Committee on the Traffic in
Opium and other Dangerous Drugs, Anslinger claimed that "marihua-
na addicts are becoming one of the major police problems. While it
is admitted by .. .officers that marihuana offenses do not show up
directly in many cases, they state their estimate to be that fifty percent
of the violent crimes committed in districts occupied by Mexicans,
Turks, Filipinos, Greeks, Spaniards, Latin-Americans and Negroes,
may be traced to the abuse of marihuana. '228
Anslinger's comments are all the more remarkable in light of his
likely awareness of their falsity. Several scientific studies, all of them
226. Id.
227. Id. at 20. Examples of sensational headlines include: Murder Weed Found Up and
Down Coast -Deadly Marihuana Dope Plant Ready for Harvest That Means Enslavement of
California Children (L.A. EXAMINER, Nov. 5, 1933); Dope Officials Helpless to Curb Marihuana
Use (S.F. ExAMINER, Nov. 7, 1933). Under the headline, Murders Due to "KilleT Drug"
Marihuana Sweeping United States, the following appeared in the Universal News Service in 1936:
Shocking crimes of violence are increasing. Murders, slaughterings, cruel
mutilations, maimings, done in cold blood, as if some hideous monster was amok in the
land.
Alarmed Federal and State authorities attribute much of this violence to the "killer
drug."
That's what experts call marihuana. It is another name of hashish. It's a derivative
of Indian hemp, a roadside weed in almost every State in the Union.
Those addicted to marihuana, after an early feeling of exhilaration, soon lose all
restraints, all inhibitions. They become bestial demoniacs, filled with the mad lust to
kill....
LARRY SLOMAN, REEFER MADNESS: THE HISTORY OF MARIJUANA IN AMERICA 44 (Bobbs-
Merrill 1979).
228. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TRAFFIC IN OPIUM AND OTHER
DANGEROUS DRUGS, THE ABUSE OF CANNABIS IN THE UNITED STATES (ADDENDUM) [O.C.
1542 (L)], Nov. 10, 1934, (quoted in Hamowy, supra note 149, at 21).
In 1937, Anslinger was quoted in the Washington Herald as stating that "if the hideous
monster Frankenstein came face to face with the monster Marihuana, he would drop dead of
fright." WASHINGTON HERALD, April 12, 1937, (quoted in BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra
note 222, at 117).
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familiar to the FBN, repudiated the connection between marijuana and
violence. The Indian Hemp Drugs Commission Report of 1893-94
reported that "the moderate use of hemp drugs is practically attended
by no evil results at all." '229 Similarly, the Panama Canal Zone Study
of 1925, which sought to investigate marijuana use among American
troops stationed in the Canal Zone, found that "there is no evidence
that marihuana ... is a 'habit-forming' drug in the sense in which the
term is applied to alcohol, opium, cocaine, etc., or that it has any
appreciably deleterious influence on the individuals using it. "230
Given the prominence of this report, "there seems little doubt that
Anslinger chose to neglect what scientific evidence existed concerning
the consequences of marijuana use."231
Commissioner Anslinger's campaign to have the Uniform Narcotic
Drug Act passed by the various states proved eminently successful. By
1937 it had been enacted in forty states, twenty-nine of which included
the optional provision concerning marijuana. 2  Anslinger next
turned his attention to the enactment of a federal law governing
marijuana.2 13 The publicity mounted by the FBN laid the ground-
work for federal control. In light of the speed and the ease with which
the MTA passed through Congress, it is likely that little additional
pressure was needed. Nevertheless, Anslinger's accounts of the
connection between marijuana and violence became even more
intemperate in his testimony before Congress. Despite having no
pharmacological background, Anslinger testified as to the dosage of
marijuana he thought to be dangerous. He stated that "I believe in
some cases one [marijuana] cigarette might develop a homicidal mania,
probably to kill his brother. 234
229. INDIAN HEMP COMMISSION, MARIJUANA: REPORT OF THE INDIAN HEMP DRUGS
COMMISSION, 1893-94 263 (Thomas Jefferson Co., 1969) (quoted in BONNIE & WHITEBREAD,
supra note 222, at 130-31).
230. Canal Zone Report, December 18, 1925, at 2-3 (quoted in BONNIE & WHITEBREAD,
supra note 222, at 134).
231. Hamowy, supra note 149, at 22.
232. Id.
233. The Anslinger hypothesis holds that the FBN's reports from the early 1930s show that
"Commissioner Anslinger personally regarded marihuana use as a vice requiring federal attention.
From his first year as head of the FBN, his correspondence advocated eventual national controls."
Himmelstein, supra note 217, at 56. Himmelstein, however, argues that the FBN was not a moral
crusading bureaucracy but an organization seeking to survive in an inhospitable environment by
limiting its purview. Anslinger only advocated federal marijuana legislation after congressional
attention had been directed toward the sensationalized dangers of marijuana. Id.
234. U.S. Senate, Finance Committee Subcommittee, Hearings on H.R. 6906, 75th Cong.,
1st sess. (1937), at 11 (quoted in BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 222, at 157).
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The official representative of the American Medical Association,
Dr. William C. Woodward, testified against the language of the bill on
the grounds that cannabis might prove to have substantial medical
benefits and that the bill unnecessarily inhibited the prerogatives of
physicians.235 It would appear that the battles over the Harrison Act
and its subsequent enforcement had substantially reduced the medical
profession's influence regarding narcotic drugs since, after minimal
debate, 236 the bill passed the House and the Senate and was signed
into law on August 2, 1937.237
The MTA was nominally a revenue-producing act that imposed
a tax on those who prescribed or dispensed marijuana. But, like the
Harrison Act, the MTA effectively discontinued the use of marijuana
as a medicinal agent.238 Consistent with Himmelstein's argument
that Anslinger's support for federal legislation had been an unintended
consequence of his efforts to have the states pass the Uniform Narcotic
Drug Act, soon after the MTA was passed, the FBN reversed its
field, dropped the tone of panic from its reports, and suggested that themarijuana problem was being brought under control.240
D. The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act (CDAPCA)
In the late 1940s, Congressional furor was aroused by the new
assertion, previously rejected by Commissioner Anslinger in 1937, that
the use of marijuana led to the use of harder drugs.241 This new
rationale for the control of marijuana use continued throughout the
1950s. 2 42 In 1951, Congress passed the Boggs Act,243 which estab-
lished mandatory prison terms and increased penalties for all drug
violators. For the first time, marijuana was lumped together with the
'narcotic" drugs since the Act provided uniform penalties for the
Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act 244 and the MTA.241 In
235. For complete report of Dr. Woodward's testimony, see BONNIE & WHITEBREAD,
supra note 222, at 164-72.
236. Hamowy, supra note 149, at 24.
237. Public L. No. 238 (75th Cong.), 2 August 1937 (50 stat. 551 (1937)).
238. Hamowy, supra note 149, at 24.
239. See id.
240. DUKE & GROSS, supra note 158.
241. BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 222, at 204.
242. Id.
243. Boggs Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-235, 65 Stat. 767 as amended by Narcotic Control
Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-728, 70 Stat. 567.
244. Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, ch. 202, 42 Stat. 596 (1922) (repealed 1970).
245. Marijuana Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 75-238, ch. 553, 50 Stat. 551 (1937) (repealed 1970).
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1956, Congress further escalated the penalties when it passed the
Narcotic Control Act.246 The states followed the federal lead in both
cases.24
7
The Boggs Act marked an ideological shift. The intrinsic danger
of marijuana was redefined from a drug that induced heinous acts of
violence, to its role as a "stepping stone" or "gateway" drug that led
to the use of harder narcotics. This ideological shift was precipitated
by the long-postponed entry of science into marijuana's legal history.
In a paper filed as an exhibit to the Boggs Act hearings,2 48 Dr. Harris
Isabel, director of research at the Public Health service hospital in
Kentucky, exploded the myth that marijuana induces violence when he
relayed the consensus that had developed within the scientific
community since the mid-1930s.249 While he acknowledged the
possibility of marijuana causing "temporary psychosis" in "predisposed
individuals," he stated that marijuana was not physically addictive and
did not produce crime nor cause insanity.2 50
Despite Dr. Isabel's testimony, Congress approved increased
penalties for marijuana users. The simple rationale was that Congress
was seeking to excise narcotic use from American society. Marijuana,
no longer important in itself, was assigned the new role of the"gateway drug. 251  Beginning in 1951, this rationale became the
cornerstone of official marijuana doctrine.
Acceptance of this dogma had an interesting consequence.
Marijuana had been defined as a narcotic in the twenties; this fact drew
the statutory nexus between marijuana and other opiates. However,
despite its comparison to opiates, marijuana still retained its own
246. Pub. L. No. 84-728, 70 Stat. 567 (1956).
247. BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 222, at 204.
248. Hearings on H.R. 3490 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, Subcomm. on
Narcotics, 82nd Congr. 1st sess. 147 (1951) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 3490].
249. BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 222, at 213.
250. Hearings on H.R. 3490, supra note 248, at 147-48 (testimony of Dr. Harris Isabel). Dr.
Isabel testified that
Marijuana smokers generally are mildly intoxicated, giggle, laugh, bother no one, and
have good time. They do not stagger or fall, and ordinarily will not attempt to harm
anyone.
It has not been proved that smoking marijuana leads to crimes of violence or to
crimes of a sexual nature. Smoking marijuana has no unpleasant after-effects, no
dependence is developed on the drug, and the practice can easily be stopped at any time.
In fact, it is probably easier to stop smoking marijuana cigarettes than tobacco cigarettes.
In predisposed individuals, marijuana may precipitate temporary psychosis and is,
therefore, not an innocuous practice with them.
U.S. Senate, Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, 82nd Cong.,
1st sess., 119 pt. 14, exhibit 1, (1951).
251. BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 222, at 213.
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distinct identity. Once the myths had been dispelled, the substantial
pharmacological disparity between marijuana and the opiates caused
marijuana to be considered as something of a weak sibling in the
family of abusable drugs.5 2 Nevertheless, this differentiation did not
trigger a public policy review because of a paradoxical twist. Under
the gateway rationale, marijuana no longer had its own identity.
Because its primary danger was now thought to be its role in opiate
addiction, marijuana became inextricably bound to the opiates from a
political and legal standpoint. 213  Consequently, marijuana prohibi-
tion remained, and continues to be, impervious to arguments that
proceed on the basis of its harmlessness or usefulness as compared to
narcotics. With the subsequent declaration of the drug war and its
escalation, marijuana was brought "along for the ride. 254
In 1969 Richard Nixon catapulted drug abuse to the center of the
political stage by declaring it a "national threat. "255 "Law and
Order" had been a key theme for the Republicans in the 1968
campaign. Nixon drew on the longstanding association between drugs
and crime to heighten popular concerns and forge a consensus for
action. While drug use had long been linked to crime in public
thinking, the general phenomenon of crime was not automatically
linked to drugs until the Nixon years.25 6 In Congress, Nixon de-
clared that "[w]ithin the last decade, the abuse of drugs has grown
from essentially a local police problem into a serious national threat.
... A national awareness of the gravity of the situation is needed; a
new urgency and concerted national policy are needed at the Federal
level to begin to cope with this growing menace. "257
The president backed this rhetoric with legislative initiative. In
1970, the CDAPCA merged previous federal antidrug regulations
under one statute.258 Whereas the Harrison Act and the MTA based
jurisdiction of drug control on the constitutional power to tax, the
CDAPCA was based on the more expansive power of the Commerce
Clause. 2 9  "As Nixon's war-on-drugs campaign succeeded legisla-
252. Id. at 214.
253. Id. at 214-15.
254. Id. at 204.
255. EVA BERTRAM ET AL., DRUG WAR POLITICS: THE PRICE OF DENIAL 105 (1996).
256. Id.
257. Text of Nixon Message on Plan to Attack Drug Abuse, 24 CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY ALMANAC 57A (1969).
258. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (Law. Co-op 1984).
259. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, A NATIONAL
REPORT: DRUGS, CRIME, AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 77 (1992) [hereinafter A NATIONAL
REPORT].
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tively, anti-drug spending ballooned. Spending on drug enforcement
alone climbed from $43 million in fiscal 1970 to $321 million in fiscal
1975. ' '260 With the rise in federal spending, a vast new bureaucracy
emerged to combat drugs. By the late 1960s the FBN still had a
relatively modest budget of $6 million and a staff of some 300
agents. 261 A second agency, the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control, had
been created in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in
1965 to regulate hypnotics and stimulants. In 1968, the two agencies
were merged to form the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
(BNDD). The BNDD was placed in the Justice Department, thus
ensuring that drugs would continue to be defined as a criminal
problem rather than a health problem.2 62
Nixon forcefully expanded the bureaucratic base for the war on
drugs.263 When the BNDD resisted the administration's attempt to
shift its enforcement focus from the higher levels of the drug distribu-
tion system to street level dealers, Nixon countered with an executive
order establishing a new agency under direct White House control: the
Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement (ODALE).264 In 1973, the
administration consolidated the BNDD, ODALE, the office of
National Narcotics Intelligence, and the Customs Service Drug
Investigation Unit into a new drug superagency: the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration (DEA).265 With the escalation in drug war
rhetoric and policies came the meteoric rise in the agency's fund-
ing.266
In 1973, Nixon declared victory in the drug war when he
announced that "we have turned the corner on drug addiction in the
United States. ' 267  The federal antidrug effort was toned down,
programs were moved from the White House to the federal bureaucra-
cy, public campaigns against street dealers and users were abandoned,
and the visibility and controversy of the federal effort was dramatically
reduced.268  Nevertheless, the laws, institutions, and logic of the
Nixon drug war remained in place. Similarly, far from being reduced,
the federal antidrug budget continued to grow at an exponential
260. BERTRAM, supra note 255, at 107.
261. Id.
262. MUSTO, supra note 167, at 234, 239-41.
263. BERTRAM, supra note 255, at 107.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 108.
266. See A NATIONAL REPORT, supra note 259.
267. BERTRAM, supra note 255, at 108.
268. Id.
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rate-reaching $17 billion in 1996.269 The war on drugs and thus
the war on marijuana has become an entrenched fixture in American
society.
V. THE MODERN DEBATE
The accounts offered by Commissioner Anslinger or by Dr.
Hamilton Wright in the early part of the century would seem
laughable in light of modern evidence were it not for the fact that
similar assertions are still being made. Though the rhetoric has
softened to some degree, the modern debate concerning the medical use
of marijuana is still characterized by generalizations, stigmatization,
and prejudice. Much of the testimony presented before Congress
evidences a blindness to many facts regarding the medical uses of
marijuana, a confusion of the medical marijuana issue with that of drug
use in general, a hostility towards the medical profession, and ad
hominem attacks against the proponents of medical marijuana. Given
the availability of studies showing the beneficial uses of marijuana and
the number of respected opinions that have advocated its use as a
medicine, Congressional resistance to deal with this question in
anything but the most hostile manner can only be considered deliberate
and motivated by extraneous concerns.
The President of the Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of
America testified that "there has not been one scientific study that has
proven that smoke marijuana is both a safe and effective treatment forany medical condition. ' '1 7° A past president of the California Narcot-
ic Officers' Association testified before Congress that "marijuana is
known to trigger attacks of manic depression, schizophrenia and
memory loss. An increase in teen suicides has been linked to
marijuana use. "271
269. Luna, supra note 158, at 522-23. Since the early 1980s, the federal bureaucracy has
spent over $100 billion on antidrug programs. Moreover, in 1990, the Defense Department spent
approximately $1 billion for airplanes, helicopters, boats, and tracking devices in order to intercept
foreign narcotics. International drug interdiction efforts (e.g., crop eradication or foreign aid) have
been estimated at an additional $1 billion per year. Experts estimate that the total expenditure
of public funds for the drug war, whether federal, state, or local, comes to $75 billion annually.
Id.
270. The Issues Surrounding the Medicinal Use of Marijuana, 1997: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, House Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. (1997) available in 1997 WL 14151534
[hereinafter 1997 Judiciary hearings] (statement of James E. Copple, President & CEO,
Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America) [hereinafter Copple testimony].
271. 1997 Judiciary hearings, supra note 270, at 11, available in 1997 WL 14151533
(statement of Ronald E. Brooks, Past President California Narcotic Officers' Association)
[hereinafter Brooks testimony].
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These and other generalized statements ignore a significant
number of counterexamples and evidence to the contrary. They either
obscure, or deny outright, the numerous clinical studies and case
reports that have shown marijuana to be both safe and effective in
treating a number of ailments. For example, in 1972, the Canadian
government's Le Dain Commission found that the "short-term
physiological effects of smoking marijuana are 'slight' and have 'little
clinical significance.' 27 2 In the same year, the report of the National
Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse found the only proven
damage to be bronchitis in heavy, chronic smokers. 3  In 1980, the
privately funded Drug Abuse Council issued a report in which it found
that "marijuana use in moderate amounts over a short term poses far
less of a threat to an individual's health than does indiscriminate use
of alcohol and tobacco. 274
Dr. Lester Grinspoon pointed to the irony of the situation.
Since so much research has been done on marijuana, often in unsuc-
cessful efforts to show health hazards and addictive potential, we
know more about it than about most prescription drugs. The years
of effort devoted to showing that marijuana is exceedingly dangerous
have proved the opposite. It is safer, with fewer serious side effects,
than most prescription medicines, and far less addictive or subject
to abuse than many drugs now used as muscle relaxants, hypnotics,
and analgesics.275
A comprehensive examination of numerous clinical and experien-
tial reports taken over a period of two years led Drug Enforcement
Agency administrative judge Francis L. Young to recommend that
marijuana be made medically available.27 6  While Judge Young
concluded that marijuana did not have an accepted use for treating
glaucoma, 27  he found that it does have a medically accepted use in
272. DUKE & GROSS, supra note 158, at 51-52.
273. Id. (citing National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse, Technical Papers of the
First Report of the National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse, vol. 1 at 52 (Government
Printing Office, 1972)).
274. DUKE & GROSS, supra note 158, at 52 (citing Drug Abuse Council, The Facts About
"Drug Abuse" (New York: Free Press, 1980)).
275. 1997 Judiciary hearings, supra note 270, at 1677, available in 1997 WL 14151530
(testimony of Dr. Lester Grinspoon, M.D., associate Professor of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical
School) [hereinafter Grinspoon testimony].
276. In the Matter of Marijuana Rescheduling Petition [Drug Enforcement Administration],
No. 86-22, Opinion and Recommended Ruling, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Decision of A.L.J. Francis L. Young at 68 [hereinafter Young opinion].
277. Id. at 39.
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treating symptoms of multiple sclerosis 278 and for nausea and vomit-
ing resulting from chemotherapy in some cancer patients.279  Judge
Young concluded that the evidence "clearly shows that marijuana has
been accepted as capable of relieving the distress of great numbers of
very ill people, and doing so with safety under medical supervision.
It would be unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious for DEA to
continue to stand between those sufferers and the benefits of this sub-
stance. "280
Notwithstanding Judge Young's thoroughly documented opinion,
the head of the DEA denied the petition for rescheduling, relying upon
the "common sense" that there is no medical use for marijuana.281
In denying the petition, the DEA administrator derided the evidence
on which Judge Young based his opinion as being anecdotal, and
therefore unreliable.282 Indeed, many of the opponents of medical
marijuana rest their claim that no evidence exists as to the efficacy of
marijuana on the basis that there have been no double-blind controlled
studies done that meet FDA standards. Dr. Kassirer has pointed out
the speciousness of this argument on two grounds. First, the noxious
sensations that patients experience are extremely difficult to quantify
in controlled experiments. Because "there is no risk of death from
smoking marijuana [w]hat really counts for a therapy with this kind of
safety margin is whether a seriously ill patient feels relief as a result of
the intervention, not whether a controlled trial 'proves' its effica-
cy.''28  Second, despite nearly a century of mechanisms for assessing
safety and efficacy, the government almost never permits clinical
research on marijuana. 284
A puzzling aspect of the debate over medical marijuana is the
prevalence with which its opponents invoke the danger and magnitude
of the drug problem as an argument against allowing terminally ill
patients to use marijuana. One would expect the dangers of crack or
heroin addiction to have little relevance in this debate. Nevertheless,
the opponents of medical marijuana repeatedly link the question to that
278. Id. at 54-55.
279. Id. at 34.
280. Id. at 68.
281. See Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 827, 940 P.2d at 629 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (citing
Marijuana Scheduling Petition, 57 Fed. Reg. 10499 (1992)).
282. Marijuana Scheduling Petition, 57 Fed. Reg. 10499 (1992), aff'd, Alliance for Cannabis
Therapeutics v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 15 F.3d 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
283. Kassirer, supra note 213, at 366.
284. Id. See also Grinspoon testimony, supra note 275, at 15 (noting that legal, bureau-
cratic, and financial obstacles have been constantly put in the way of conducting double-blind
studies on marijuana).
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of drug use in general." 5 This link is established in three ways.
First, many of those opposed to allowing the medicinal use of
marijuana accuse its proponents of using the issue as a "trojan horse"
to legalize all drugs.286 Opponents of medical marijuana, such as
Senator Orrin Hatch, claim that those who advocate allowing marijuana
to be prescribed by a physician are engaged in a disingenuous
campaign that conceals their true objective-the legalization of
drugs. 7  Such accusations amount to little more than personal
attacks on the veracity of those who advocate allowing marijuana use
in limited, medical situations pursuant to a doctor's prescription.
The second method used to link this issue to general drug use is
the classic argument that marijuana is a "gateway drug" that leads to
the use of other drugs. 288  Although it has been repeatedly invoked
since the 1950s, his argument is clearly specious for a number of
reasons. First, it confuses a correlation with a cause. The argument
implies that marijuana use by a teenager will cause him or her to use
harder drugs in the future. The complexity of factors involved in
teenage drug use can explain this correlation in a number of different
ways. For example, the experimental nature of certain teenagers is
likely to lead those individuals to use any drug available. The fact that
marijuana is the cheapest and most readily available drug likely
explains the extent to which it is the first drug tried by many such
teens. This argument erroneously assumes that if marijuana is
removed, teenagers will not try any other drugs. Such reasoning is
tantamount to the argument that because the first sexual experience of
the vast majority of sexual offenders was masturbatory, prohibiting
masturbation will result in a reduction of sex crimes. Moreover, as one
doctor noted, "the American Medical News reported that almost 70
million Americans older than 12 years had tried marijuana at least
285. See, e.g., Brooks testimony, supra note 271, at 3 (claiming that with the end of the cold
war, the greatest threat to the security of our nation is drug use); 1997 Judiciary hearings, supra
note 270, at 13, available in 1997 WL 14151530 (General Barry M. McCaffrey testifying)
[hereinafter McCaffrey testimony] (noting that "illicit drug use by adolescents has been increasing
steadily since 1992").
286. See, e.g., Brooks testimony, supra note 271, at 7 (arguing that "true compassion would
mean that the pro-drug lobby would stop using sick and dying persons as pawns in their strategy
to achieve drug legalization"); Copple testimony, supra note 270, at 9 (implying that money spent
in support of medical marijuana initiatives supports drug legalization efforts).
287. Arizona and California Medical Drug Use Initiatives: Hearing of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, 105th Cong. (1996) (statement of Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) Chair) [hereinafter
Hatch statement].
288. See, e.g., McCaffrey testimony, supra note 285, at 17 (pointing to statistics that show
that a teenager who uses marijuana is 85 times more likely to use cocaine than one who does not).
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once. Not all of these 70 million lives were ruined. '289  Perhaps
more importantly, the "gateway" argument is misplaced in this arena.
It is difficult to see how the use of marijuana by a terminally ill cancer
patient can lead America's youth to drug addiction.
The final method by which medical marijuana is linked to the
general drug problem lies in the argument that permitting the medical
use of smoked marijuana will send a false message to adolescents that
marijuana is beneficial. 29' This argument loses much of its strength
in light of the fact that cocaine and morphine are listed under Schedule
II and are prescribed by doctors for limited medicinal purposes. Upon
being confronted with this argument, Judge Young dismissed it out of
hand, noting that "the fear of sending such a signal cannot be
permitted to override the legitimate need, amply demonstrated in this
record, of countless sufferers for the relief marijuana can provide when
prescribed by a physician in a legitimate case. 291
While drug abuse is certainly a pressing social problem with
which the legislature is rightfully concerned, it is, at best, tenuously
related to the prescribed use of marijuana by seriously ill patients.
Dennis Peron, one of the authors of the California initiative allowing
the prescription of marijuana, vented his frustration before Congress
over the linking of these issues when he said:
I find it very ironic here that we're hearing from all these people
from the criminal justice system. We're talking about medical
marijuana but they're all talking about crack. We have the inner
city houses blowing up with methamphetamine factories. But all
they can talk about is medical marijuana. I'm not a drug legalizer.
I'm against that. They're running around chasing potheads while
Rome is burning. They are ignoring the real problems of America,
this young boy that just died of alcohol, 18 years old in Virginia.
That's nothing to everybody. All these people that die of alcohol,
all these people that die of cigarettes, they're just written off. No
one cares about them. All you care about is this medical marijua-
na.292
By linking marijuana scheduling to the general drug question, the
proponents of medical marijuana are conceptually placed with those
advocating the complete legalization of drugs. Opinions in the drug
legalization debate are deeply entrenched and highly polarized.
289. William A. Hensel, M.D., 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1184 (1997).
290. See McCaffrey testimony, supra note 285, at 16.
291. Young opinion, supra note 276, at 68.
292. 1997 Judiciary hearings, supra note 270 (testimony of Dennis Peron).
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Proponents of increased efforts to suppress drugs are pitted against
libertarians who advocate the removal of drug control. All questions
regarding drugs of any kind have become stark black-and-white issues.
Thus, any opinion that does not fit squarely against drugs is pigeon-
holed as advocating legalization. In situations where opinions are so
polarized and long-standing, the middle ground often tends to be
disregarded or overlooked. In this setting, neither side can compromise
their position or even acknowledge that alternatives exist. Meanwhile,
middle ground approaches, like those that focus on harm reduction or
address health concerns, are stifled, impeded, or ignored.293
Perhaps the most telling aspect of the way in which this debate
has degenerated is the extent of the hostility exhibited toward the
medical profession and toward intellectuals in general. Claims that the
rescheduling of marijuana will result in its being prescribed on request
for fictitious ailments, or "to help everything from writer's cramp to
diarrhea," '294 evidence a lack of faith in the judgment and honesty of
doctors. Such claims imply a conspiracy between doctors and
recreational marijuana users and thus implicitly attack the professional
integrity of physicians. These quixotic conspiracy theories show the
degree to which the distinction made by the Medical World 75 years
ago2 %9 between "dope peddling" and treating physicians remains
obscured to this day.
The hostility that the opponents of medical marijuana have
exhibited toward the medical profession similarly extends to the
intellectual community in general. The president of the Anti-Drug
Coalition painted a vivid picture of "us" against "them," wherein
upstanding Americans are deliberately being deceived by the intellectu-
al and cultural elite.296 While such defensive posturing is under-
standable in light of the many scholars who have decried a continued
inflexible adherence to draconian drug policies, 297 it evinces an anti-
intellectual disposition reminiscent of McCarthyism. 298 Not surpris-
293. Gilmore, supra note 114, at 428.
294. McCaffrey testimony, supra note 285, at 19.
295. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
296. See generally Copple testimony, supra note 270.
297. See War on Drugs, supra note 138, at 1401; Luna, supra note 158, at 485 (noting a list
of jurists, academics, and community leaders who have spoken out against the war on drugs. This
list includes Nobel laureates Milton Friedman and Gary Becker; former Secretary of State George
Schultz; commentator William F. Buckley; sociopolitical author Thomas Sowell; scientist Carl
Sagan; Baltimore mayor Kurt Schmoke; and federal judges Richard Posner, Jack Weinstein,
Whitman Knapp, William Schwarzer, Robert Sweet, Harold Greene, and James Paine).
298. See Richard J. Rovere, The Frivolous Demagogue, ESQUIRE, June 1983, at 138
(commenting on the legacy of Senator Joseph McCarthy: "He stamped with his name a tendency,
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ingly, intellectuals who have supported marijuana rescheduling have
found themselves subject to personal and contemptuous attacks by its
opponents.299 When viewed in conjunction with the generalizations,
the confusion of the issues, and the manner with which evidence of
marijuana's efficacy is dismissed, these ad hominem attacks give
credence to the belief "that emotion and symbolism govern the debate
over marijuana. '"300 This dominance of emotion and symbolism
within the legislative debates provides a clear indication that the
legislative system is not operating effectively with respect to this issue.
VI. PRAGMATIC POLITICS: THE NEED FOR REPRESENTATION
REINFORCEMENT REVIEW
To dismiss the opponents of medical marijuana as being irrational
ideologues would be overly dismissive and would degenerate this
inquiry into mere name-calling. There are, to be sure, several
pragmatic reasons that explain the intractable opposition to the
reclassification of marijuana as a Schedule II drug. Primarily,
politicians stand to gain substantial political benefits by taking an
uncompromising stance to anything involving drugs and thereby
portraying themselves as being "tough on drugs." With the replace-
ment of the cold war with the war on drugs, 3 1 the accusation of
being "soft on drugs" has replaced that of being "soft on communism"
in political rhetoric. Moreover, a politician must institute some action
in order to claim the label of being "tough on drugs." Enacting or
supporting antidrug measures is publicly portrayed as "doing some-
thing" about this social problem and is depicted as being morally
superior to "doing nothing.""3 2
a whole cluster of tendencies in American life. The name survives. To many Americans,
whatever is illiberal, antiintellectual, repressive, reactionary, totalitarian or merely swinish will
hereafter be McCarthyism.").
299. One example is William Bennett's condescending response to Nobel laureate economist
Milton Friedman's plea for drug policy reform (Milton Friedman, An Open Letter to Bill Bennett,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 1989, at A14). Bennett's reply included the following:
A true friend of freedom understands that government has a duty to craft and
uphold laws that help educate citizens about right and wrong.
Today this view is ridiculed by liberal elites and entirely neglected by you. So
while I cannot doubt the sincerity of your opinion on drug legalization, I find it difficult
to respect.
William J. Bennett, A Response to Milton Friedman, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1989, at A30.
300. Hensel, supra note 289, at 336.
301. See Brooks testimony, supra note 271, at 3 (claiming that drug use has supplanted
Communism as the foremost threat to the nation).
302. Barnett, supra note 137, at 2618.
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Along with the political considerations, modern drug policies have
generated powerful interests. The notable beneficiaries of drug
prohibition include drug researchers who rely almost exclusively on
funding from government grants to find alternative drugs to replace the
benefits that some illicit drugs provide." 3 Even more importantly,
law enforcement agencies at all levels of government receive massive
funding to fight the war on drugs and thus constitute a powerful
interest institutionally opposed to any legislation perceived as scaling
back the war on drugs-including allowing the medicinal use of
marijuana.
Bureaucratic funding policies have created powerful interest
groups of antimarijuana crusaders. These groups continually "hound
those who support the return of marijuana to medicine. Such
reformers are consistently accused of simply using the medical
argument as a cheap gimmick to slip pot to our schoolchildren-and
sometimes of being marijuana addicts whose judgment is clouded with
fumes of the deadly drug. 30 4
When Congress defers to DEA opinions regarding drug policy,
they defer to an agency that has a strong organizational interest against
any curtailment of the war on drugs. It is therefore not surprising that
the DEA Administrator refused to follow Judge Young's recommenda-
tion that marijuana be reclassified as a Schedule II drug.30 5
Given the polarized nature of the drug issue and the bureaucratic
interests opposed to curtailing the drug war, a politician endorsing the
medicinal use of marijuana is likely to be viewed as being "soft on
drugs" and is therefore likely to incur strong opposition by powerful
bureaucratic interests. In contrast, "when politicians cry 'get tough on
drugs,' whose vote do they lose? 306  The political imprudence of
supporting marijuana rescheduling is manifestly obvious. In such a
state of affairs, the political nature of Congress makes it institutionally
incapable of dealing with the question of medical marijuana in
anything but the most cursory and hostile manner. 7
303. Id.
304. ARNOLD S. TREBACH, THE GREAT DRUG WAR 308 (1987).
305. Marijuana Scheduling Petition, 57 Fed. Reg. 10499 (1992).
306. Barnett, supra note 137, at 2618.
307. Such hostility characterized the October 1, 1997, debates before the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on Crime. The following excerpt from the exchange between Dr. Lester
Grinspoon, and Representative Barr provides an apt example of the pervading acrimony.
REP. BARR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Grinspoon, earlier I think you were here
for the previous panel, is that correct? DR. GRINSPOON: Yes, I was. REP. BARR:
I made some references there to your suggestion that marijuana can be effective against
various things. Do you recall that? DR. GRINSPOON: Yes, I do. REP. BARR:
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The political and organizational factors that align against
marijuana rescheduling are not easily overcome. When coupled with
the influences of prevailing societal prejudices, it becomes manifestly
obvious that people with a medical need for marijuana cannot expect
their interests to be fairly addressed in Congress. Such people cannot,
therefore, be dismissed as mere perennial political losers, but must be
regarded as a burdened class.
The extent to which the passage of the various acts used to
regulate drugs rested and continues to rest on discreditable reasons and
motivations should, in itself, cause the statutes to be subjected to strict
scrutiny," 8 and therefore justified in light of their application to an
individual. Such justification can only come by applying strict judicial
scrutiny to cases involving the medicinal use of marijuana. Moreover,
the fact that various prejudices continue to distort the view of many
legislators when dealing with the prospect of rescheduling marijuana
should raise marijuana scheduling to suspect status. The Courts must
recognize that, due to political, organizational, and historical pressures,
That list appears in your publication, Marijuana, the Forbidden Medicine, is that
correct? DR. GRINSPOON: Yes. REP. BARR: You discovered something Ponce
de Leon didn't discover. DR. GRINSPOON: Pardon? REP. BARR: You remember
Ponce de Leon searching for the Fountain of Youth, never found it. You've apparently
found it. DR. GRINSPOON: No, that's not true. Have you read the book? REP.
BARR: Then what you say in that book, that aging - DR. GRINSPOON: How do
you know what I say if you haven't - REP. BARR: Marijuana can be effective.
That's not true? You're disputing that now? DR. GRINSPOON: Pardon? REP.
BARR: I'm just asking. You might like to take the opportunity now to correct the
record. Your publication, Marijuana, the Forbidden Medicine, then, does not state that
you believe that marijuana can be effective against aging? DR. GRINSPOON: No,
that's not what it says. REP. BARR: So these quotes, apparently you are changing
those. DR. GRINSPOON: No, you have them wrong. You obviously have not read
that chapter in my book. But perhaps that's the only one you haven't read. REP.
BARR: I know that you're a great self-promoter. You describe yourself in your
literature here as the complete medical scholar. (Cross talk.) DR. GRINSPOON: I do
not describe myself - I don't know what you're reading from - REP. BARR: I'm
reading from your material here. Page 23. DR. GRINSPOON: I can assure you I did
not write those words. REP. BARR: Well, you could have fooled me because you're
just sitting here - but apparently, maybe there are some of your colleagues that are
impressed, but - DR. GRINSPOON: Well, you are clearly very easily fooled. REP.
BARR: You're published in different languages, that that makes it true and somehow
lends validity to your position. I don't believe that. I'd like to ask Mr. Brooks. Your
resume isn't quite as self-promotional. You're putting your reputation and your life -
Mr. Peron objects to that, the libertarian objects to it. MR. PERON: Mr. Barr, this
kind of cheap political grandstanding is out of place in a hearing in this room. REP.
BARR: You can leave. You can leave. You can leave any time.
Fed. Doc. Clearinghouse Inc. Congressional Testimony October 1, 1997 (testimony of Dr. Lester
Grinspoon).
308. See ELY, supra note 13, at 153.
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the legislature does not provide a viable forum in which the interests
of those with a medical need for marijuana can be addressed. Their
only hope for recourse lies, therefore, in courts that are theoretically
less subject to the whims of politics.
VII. CONCLUSION
In emphasizing the indispensable role that the judiciary plays in
guarding basic individual rights against majoritarian control, Justice
Douglas cited to Edmond Cahn who argued that "we are entitled to
reproach the majoritarian justices of the Supreme Court ... with
straining to be reasonable when they should be adamant."3 9
Douglas further quoted Cahn's constitutional admonition:
Be not reasonable with inquisitions, anonymous informers, and
secret files that mock American justice. Be not reasonable with...
labels of disloyalty, and all the other stratagems for outlawing
human beings from the community of mankind. These devices have
put us to shame. Exercise the full judicial power of the United
States; nullify them, forbid them; and make us proud again."'
When Washington's Supreme Court refused to submit the
question of marijuana scheduling to strict scrutiny, it failed to fulfill its
representation reinforcement review function and failed to safeguard an
individual's rights from majoritarian control. Perhaps this was due to
the popularly elected status of the court's position, or perhaps the
members of the court have been influenced by the bias that has
stigmatized drug users and drugs in general. Whatever the reason, the
court was presented with an opportunity to safeguard the otherwise
unrepresented interest of an insular minority and the court failed to do
so. For Mr. Seeley and those in his position, the result was nothing
short of tragic. Mr. Seeley was confronted with a cruel dilemma of
either continuing to undergo debilitating pain or to flaunt the law and
to continue smoking marijuana as needed."' In choosing the latter,
Mr. Seeley noted that his status as a law abiding citizen has become "a
casualty of the war on drugs." '312
The dilemma faced by Mr. Seeley underscores the extent to which
this case carries implications that go beyond the question of medicinal
309. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 110 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Edmond
Cahn, Can the Supreme Court Defend Civil Liberties?, in TOWARD A BETTER AMERICA 132, 144
(Samuel, ed. 1968)).
310. Id.
311. November 14, 1997, interview, supra note 16.
312. Id. (quoted with Ralph Seeley's permission).
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marijuana and speak to the very legitimacy of the law in American
society. In view of the widespread defiance of drug prohibition laws
and the cynicism that such laws generate toward the law in gener-
al,313 the prediction made by the Woods court in 1915 has largely
come to pass. These laws have indeed "engendered resentment and
prejudice against courts and government, law and order." '314
As a result of this case, Mr. Seeley commented that "I am a
lawyer with no respect for the law or the courts. They [the court]
showed that they are politicians before they are judges."3 ' More-
over, Mr. Seeley observed the following:
[E]very cop in Tacoma knows that I have pot in this house.
They're not going to do anything about it. It isn't worth it for
them to arrest some dying cancer patient. So there it is. The police
are making those judicial decisions. In my mind, that's one of the
characteristics of a police state. 16
The type of cynicism toward the law expressed by Mr. Seeley is
a natural consequence of a law that is perceived to be grotesquely
unjust. Congress' obstinate refusal to reschedule marijuana and to
allow doctors to prescribe it to their patients not only causes cynicism,
but invites disobedience. Despite marijuana's classification as a
Schedule I drug, many people deliberately disobey the law and
continue to use marijuana to allay debilitating nausea, to stave off
AIDS-induced wasting by increasing their appetite, and to ease the
shaking brought on by multiple sclerosis. Many such people rational-
ize their decision to disobey the law by a belief that a law that denies
them relief from suffering is illegitimate. The idea of legal "legitima-
cy" does not imply that the duty to obey a duly enacted law overrides
all countervailing considerations in the deliberation of a political
subject. "A conscientious citizen may sometimes regard the wrongness
of policy to be so pronounced that she has a duty to disobey. At most,
the duty to obey a law just because it was duly enacted is a prima facie
requirement that can be overridden by sufficiently compelling moral
[or in this case, physical] considerations. 317
313. Ethan A. Nadelman, Drug Prohibition in the United States: Costs, Consequences, and
Alternatives, 245 SCI. 939, 942 (1989).
314. Woods, 224 F. at 278; see supra note 185 and accompanying text.
315. November 14, 1997, interview, supra note 16.
316. Id.
317. See PETER SINGER, DEMOCRACY AND DISOBEDIENCE 59-64 (1973). For a discussion
of the relevant normative considerations, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79-88
(1961) (a functioning legal system not only "obliges" but "obligates" subjects to comply with duly
enacted laws) (cited in Replogle, supra note 85, at 1602).
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The fact that such people are forced to choose between disobedi-
ence and physical suffering indicates that there is something deeply
problematic with marijuana legislation. Moreover, the congressional
inability to modify such legislation, and the Court's unwillingness to
examine the reasons behind that inability have resulted in paralysis and
in a failure of the judicial-legislative system. Despite his claims of
cynicism, Ralph Seeley's decision to publicly fight what he perceived
to be an unjust law was a form of civil disobedience and an expression
of the very highest respect for the law.318
In a recent interview, Federal Judge Thelton Henderson expressed
his frustration over draconian marijuana sentencing guidelines. "I'm
not aware of anything judges can do. We can't lobby. We're pretty
much handicapped. We can speak out, such as I'm speaking out now,
and state our displeasure and hope that the time will come when
Congress will revisit this. ' 319  When confronted with the more
limited question of the use of marijuana by the burdened class of
people with a medical need for its use, a representation reinforcement
approach provides a justifiable method of escape from judicial-
legislative paralysis. "A representation reinforcing approach assigns
judges a role they are conspicuously well situated to fill .... The
point isn't so much one of expertise as it is one of perspective. 32 °
It is deeply unfortunate that the Washington Supreme Court
chose not to address the substantive issues surrounding Mr. Seeley's
situation and the medicinal use of marijuana. The court is the only
governmental body capable of addressing this question and of breaking
the judicial-legislative paralysis that surrounds it.
318. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail (1963), reprinted in
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 72, 78079 (Hugo A. Bedau ed., 1969) ("[A]n
individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust, and willingly accepts the penalty
by staying in jail to arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice, is in reality
expressing the very highest respect for law.").
319. Frontline: Busted: America's War on Marijuana (PBS television broadcast, April 28,
1998).
320. ELY, supra note 13, at 102.
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